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How Oracle Erred: 
Functionality, Useful Articles, and the Future of Computer Copyright* 
 
Wendy J. Gordon** 
 
Preface and summary 
	
In Oracle v. Google (2015), the Federal Circuit addressed whether the 
“method header” components of a dominant computer program were 
uncopyrightable as “merging” with the headers’ ideas or function.  Google had 
copied the headers to ease the ability of third-party programmers to interact with 
Google's Android platform. The court rebuffed the copyrightability challenge; it 
reasoned that because the plaintiff's expression might have been written in 
alternative forms, there was no "merger" of idea and expression. However, the 
Oracle court may have been asking the wrong question.  
In Lotus v. Borland (1995), the owner of a dominant spreadsheet program 
sought to prevent a new competitor's program from making available a set of 
'command menu' headers based on the dominant program's menus.  The defendant 
also wrote its own, original command menus, but provided the copied menus as an 
option to relieve customers who, migrating from the dominant spreadsheet, would 
otherwise have had a substantial burden to master new terms and rewrite macros.  
In assessing the legality of the copying, the First Circuit started its inquiry 
not with a question about how the plaintiff's program might have been written, but 
rather with how the program actually was written. It then identified the menu 
commands as "methods of operation" because they were necessary to make the 
	2					WJ	GORDON		April	7,	2016		DRAFT		HOW	ORACLE	ERRED	(LONG	VERSION)	
	
	
actual program operate a computer.  The copyright statute renders "methods of 
operation" per se uncopyrightable, regardless of the possibility of alternatives.  
Debates over the conflict between Oracle and Lotus have largely ignored a 
middle road that supports the Lotus result without the potential for overkill some 
observers see in Lotus. This middle road is a doctrine known as the 
“explanation/use" distinction. Laid out in the classic Supreme Court case of Baker 
v. Selden (1800), and ratified by statutory provisions of the Copyright Act 
including the much-ignored Section 113(b), the “explanation/use distinction" 
specifies that a copyright owner has no power to control behaviors that belong to 
the domain of utility patent.   Like "merger" and "method of operation", the 
"explanation/use" doctrine implements the deference that, pursuant to 
Congressional command and Supreme Court precedent, US copyright law must 
give to patent law.  However, the explanation/use doctrine operates by limiting the 
scope of the exclusive rights a copyright owner might otherwise possess, not by 
targeting the copyrightability of what the plaintiff produced.   
This chapter examines justifications for the “explanation/use distinction”, 
and suggests a two-part test for implementing that doctrine. The chapter argues that 
a copyright owner should have no prima facie rights over copying behavior where 
(1) the goals of the copying are “use” (behavior in the realm of utility patent) and 
(2) the copying is done solely for goals unrelated to the expressiveness of the 
plaintiff’s work of authorship.  (The copying of Oracle and Lotus seem to have 
been fully indifferent to expressive values; the result might be different in a case 
where defendant's goals are mixed.) 
This two-part test is met by the defendants in Oracle and Lotus. (1) Making 
a machine operate is clearly utilitarian. And as for (2) indifference to expression, 
both Lotus and Oracle involve someone copying a computer interface to enable 
users to interoperate: third party programmers could use or design Java-enabled 
programs on Android, and spreadsheet users could use their prior macros on a new 
spreadsheet program.  Interoperability is one of the few areas where indifference to 
expression is clear: after all, when one wants a spare key made, the elegance or 
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beauty of the key's shape is irrelevant – all that matters is that the shape fits the 
lock. 
1 Introduction 
The world would look far different than it does if copyright law covered 
functional expression without limit. Someone who imagines they can “build a 
better mouse trap” would need only to sketch it on paper, or  draw it on a computer  
screen and hit "save"1”, to secure for the purported innovation over seventy years 
of legal protection2 against copying.3 Anyone else who makes or sells a similar 
																																								 																				
1  Nations differ on the extent to which 'fixation in a tangible medium' is required for copyright, 
and as to the definition of 'fixation'.  Under US law pre-1978, saving a screen drawing to a 
computer disk would not have qualified as a copyrightable 'writing' because the drawing could 
not be visually perceived from the desk except with the aid of a machine; post 1978, direct visual 
perception became unnecessary.  17 U.S.C. § (2102) (definition of "copy"). Unless otherwise 
specified, all references to law are to federal law of the United States. 
2 US Copyrights that come into being today have a duration of either (a) seventy years beyond 
the life of the author, or (b) the shorter of 120 years from creation or ninety-five years from 
publication (for works made for hire and some other categories). 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). Utility 
patents by contrast have a duration of no more than twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (2012) 
(providing that utility patents end twenty years from filing date). Design patents are even shorter, 
fifteen years from the date of grant. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2015), as amended by Patent Law Treaties 
Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 91–190, § 102, 125 Stat. 1527 (2012).    
The instant chapter is concerned with the intersection of copyright law with the law of utility 
patents. That is where the most significant conflict with copyright occurs. Design patents pose no 
such tension for copyrights because, like copyrights, they are supposed to be unavailable for 
elements that are “functional.” See L. A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 
1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“If the particular design is essential to the use of the article, it cannot be 
the subject of a design patent.”) 
3 There was a period when United Kingdom and Canadian law took this extreme path. See, e.g., 
Spiro-Flex Indust. Ltd. v. Progressive Sealing Inc., 1986 CanLII 771 (BC SC), available at 
www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/1986/1986canlii771/1986canlii771.html 
Both nations now take a somewhat more patent-deferential approach to design protection. 
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device would be in danger of suit.4 By similarly simple means, any car maker or 
other manufacturer could eliminate competition in the making of spare parts. 
Markets for physical products are not the only things that would change. So 
would markets for electronics and digital content. If copyright had no boundaries 
where functionality was concerned, a designer of a leading video game could 
choose one console and, by asserting its copyright, forever5 limits its fans to that 
console. Similarly a console maker could bar any “unlicensed” game from playing 
on its machine. Or the seller of an application program could ensure that once its 
customers learn the program’s intricacies and prepare macros6 based upon its 
																																								 																				
4 Admittedly, Copyright gives rights only over "copying." By contrast, patent infringement can 
arise regardless of whether or not the defendant who makes and sells a version of the patented 
innovation has copied it or independently invented it. 
But the copyright plaintiff’s need to prove actual “copying” (a kind of “cause in fact”) is less of a 
barrier to lawsuits than it once was. Given the pervasiveness of mass media, and the internet's 
ability to gives access largely without regard to geographic boundaries, copyright defendants 
find it harder to prove they never had contact with a plaintiff’s work. Also, because subconscious 
copying can trigger copyright liability, at least in the US,  defendants cannot be sure that telling 
their truth on the witness stand (“I cannot remember copying and I believe I did not copy”) will 
make a difference, even if the jury believes them. 
5 A game (if a work for hire) would have copyright for roughly a century. Each new version of 
the game would have a new, full-duration copyright in any distinguishable variations added since 
the prior version. By continually tweaking its games, a company whose copyright knew no 
functional boundaries could lock its fan base into a particular platform for as long as the fan base 
continued to exist. By the time that the original version of a game entered the public domain, 
there would likely be no machines left capable of playing it. 
6 A user can assign a complex set of commands to a simpler keystroke command. This is called 
writing a “macro.” For example, in using a word processing program, someone who authors 
documents containing many lengthy quotations might tell her program that a particular keystroke 
combination (say, hitting “control-alt-q” at the same time) should put highlighted text into 
quotation form: indenting it and making it single spaced. Thereafter, she could properly format 
long quotes just by highlighting the relevant text and hitting control-alt-q. 
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keystroke commands, the customers’ learning and all their macros will be 
worthless if they ever switch to a new provider. The makers of computers, smart 
phones, or game consoles could limit use of their machines only to programs, apps, 
and games of which the makers approve. 
But copyright law does not cover functional expression without limit. Most 
of the results just described could not be achieved through copyright,7 for both 
Congress and the courts have sharply limited copyright’s operation in the field of 
functionality.8 Copyright law defers to patent when it comes to functional use, and 
patents are short-lived and hard to get. 
Moreover, patent law jealously guards the public domain status of the 
functional works that it declines to protect. In the words of the Supreme Court, 
“the federal patent laws do create a federal right to ‘copy and to use,’”9 a right 
which is applicable both to expired patents and to “potentially patentable ideas 
which are fully exposed to the public.”10 The patent public domain similarly 
																																								 																				
7 Regarding the examples just mentioned: an attractively shaped automobile bumper or muffler 
pipe that lacks patent can be freely copied (unless some aspect of it is a separable work of 
authorship, which is unlikely), 17 U.S.C. §101(2012) (“definition of pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works”); an original drawing of a mouse trap or other functional object can have 
copyright as a pictorial work, but the rights of the copyright owner do not extend to control over 
the manufacture and sale of the objects depicted, 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012); copyright’s fair use 
doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107, permits the copying of copyrighted computer programs for the 
purpose of making a video game compatible with existing consoles, see Sega Enters. v. 
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Accolade did not attempt to ‘scoop’ 
Sega’s release of any particular game or games, but sought only to become a legitimate 
competitor in the field of Genesis-compatible video games. Within that market, it is the 
characteristics of the game program as experienced by the user that determine the program’s 
commercial success. As we have noted, there is nothing in the record that suggests that Accolade 
copied any of those elements.”) 
8 Many of these limits are discussed at length infra. 
9 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989) (emphasis in original) 
10 Id. (citations omitted). 
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assures “‘the consuming public of the advantage to be derived’ from free 
exploitation”11 of discoveries with expired or invalid patents.12 So, unsurprisingly, 
many forms of right (including copyright,13 trademark,14 and contract15) are limited 
lest they undermine the “balance between fostering innovation and ensuring public 
access to discoveries” that “Congress struck” “[i]n crafting the patent laws.”16 
The boundary doctrines that enforce copyright’s deference to patent are 
continually threatened with erosion. In particular, the recent decision in Oracle v. 
Google17 threatens to expand copyright’s reach into functionality. That decision, by 
																																								 																				
11 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. ___, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4067, *10 (2015) (quoting 
from Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256). 
12 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. ___, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4067 (2015) (upholding the 
rule that royalty contracts are unenforceable to the extent they provide for the payment of 
royalties after the point of patent expiration.) The Supreme Court in Kimble may have had some 
doubts about the wisdom of the particular rule it upheld, but did not seem to harbor doubts about 
the importance of the patent public domain. 
13 See, e.g., 17 USC 102(b) (no copyright for systems or methods of operation); 113(b) (no 
infringement results from building a useful article depicted in a copyrighted portrayal). These 
and other limits are discussed infra, passim. 
14 No trademark can be federally registered if it is “functional,” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), and no 
unregistered trademark can give rise to suit under the Lanham Act unless the plaintiff carries the 
burden of proving nonfunctionality. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (3) (2012); Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz 
Gmbh v. Ritter Gmbh, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002). 
15 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. ___, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4067 (2015) (royalty 
contracts held unenforceable to the extent they provide for the payment of royalties after the 
point of patent expiration.) 
16 Id. at *8. 
17 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding Java’s applied 
programming interface (API) and its structure, sequence and organization, copyrightable as 
against claims of “merger” and “method of operation”). The lower court had held the copied 
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the Federal Circuit, increases the ability of market leaders to use copyright law to 
lock out competition in a functional market – and to lock their customers, their 
suppliers, and producers of complementary products into patterns that might be 
privately profitable, but inefficient or otherwise undesirable from a social 
perspective. 
As a social practice, lock-in is quite controversial. Business schools teach 
future executives how to lock in their customers and other players,18 yet antitrust 
law makes some forms of lock-in unlawful.19  Scholars debate whether various 
examples of potential lock-in might be socially harmful, socially useful, or 
irrelevant to social welfare,20 and how the law should take lock-in into account.21  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
portions of Java uncopyrightable as “methods of operation.” Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 
872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
18 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Sousa & Effy Oz, Management Information Systems (7th Ed. Cengage, 
2015) at 41, 47–8. 
19 See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to 
Intellectual Property Law, sec. 21.4 (Thomson Reuters, 2010). 
20 Compare, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz & S. E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 30 J. Law Econ. 1, 
(1990), with Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 332 
(1985). 
21  One issue is the doctrinal category through which to address lock-in.  The instant article 
makes lock-in relevant to the scope of a copyright owner's prima facie rights, but the relevance 
arises indirectly:  What's important to this chapter's analysis is whether copying is functional, 
expressive, or a mixture of both, and copying done to escape lock-in is likely to be non-
expressive and purely functional.   
Lock-in might also be relevant to copyrightability, to misuse, or to fair use.  The Solicitor 
General, for example, argues that lock-in should be examined under the fair use doctrine.  See 
e.g. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), at *17, available at 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2015/06/01/14-
410_google_v_oracle_us_cvsg_brief.pdf 
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Such arguments need not be resolved for cases like Oracle v. Google. That is 
because, in the context of computer programs, the techniques that companies use to 
enforce lock-in typically run afoul of a historic doctrine called the “use/explanation 
distinction.”22 The doctrine distinguishes between behaviors that use a copyrighted 
work expressively and those that use the work without regard to its expressive 
virtues, simply to serve a utilitarian function.\ 
For example, it is an expressive use when the publisher of a how-to book on 
home repair copies someone else’s copyrighted passage explaining how to rewire a 
lamp instead of writing his own instructions. It is a nonexpressive use when a 
homeowner applies the same copyrighted passage to the task of actually rewiring 
lighting fixtures. Copying text to convey an explanation or to serve other 
expressive goals belongs to the realm of copyright; copying to build a functional 
invention instead belongs to the realm of patent. These basic points about the 
limited rights that attach to copyright in physical products have important 
implications for computer copyright cases. 
As a result of how the Oracle v. Google litigation has been structured, the 
legal community concerned with computer copyright is currently focused on issues 
of copyrightability. It is time to redirect our attention to include the scope of a 
copyright owner’s exclusive right. 
This chapter will show how the fundamental distinction between “use” and 
“explanation” can resolve disputes like Oracle v. Google. The chapter will also 
explore a much-ignored provision in Copyright law, Subsection 113(b) that 
provides an explicit immunity for using copyrighted works functionally. 
																																								 																				
22 This chapter is focused on uses that are functional (because functional uses implicate patent 
law) and indifferent to expressivity (for the indifference removes a reason for enforcing 
copyright). Lock-in and the imposition of switching costs raise many other issues in addition. For 
example, when a copyright owner’s acts of dissemination and enforcement combine in a way 
that negatively alters another’s prospects, I argue that this does and should erode the owner’s 
scope of right. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L. J. 1533 (1993). 
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2 Oracle v. Google 
Oracle owns the Java set of programs, and Java is ubiquitous. Third-party 
programmers are able to make their apps compatible with many platforms, and 
save time in doing so, because large numbers of platforms are crafted to respond to 
Java commands with predefined Java routines and subroutines. The Java routines 
are activated when a programmer uses a specified “method header” accompanied 
by a statement –- in particular format – of the desired inputs for a method’s 
operation. Platforms are typically programmed to recognize Java method headers 
(sometimes called “declaration code”) and to implement the appropriate Java 
routines and subroutines (sometimes called "implementation code") in response. 
Google, wanting to facilitate third-party programming for the Android 
phone, tried to obtain a Java license but the parties failed to find mutually 
agreeable terms.23 Much of Java is available under General Public License terms,24 
but Google apparently found the free-software license restrictions inconsistent with 
its business plan.  Since in copyright law, unlike patent, duplication without 
copying is not infringing, Google therefore used independently written 
implementing code to substitute for Java’s implementing code.25  Wrote the lower 
court: 
It is the method body that does the heavy lifting, namely the actual 
work of taking    the inputs, crunching them, and returning an answer. The 
method body can be short or long. Google came up with its own 
																																								 																				
23 Oracle, 750 F. 3d at 1350. 
24 David Turner, The LGPL and Java, available at www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-java.html (last 
visited June 8, 2015). 
25 Oracle, 750 F. 3d at 1350. 
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implementations for the method bodies and this accounts for 97 percent of 
the code for the 37 packages.26 
(As for patent, Oracle brought patent claims against Google,27 but the jury 
rejected them.) 
It was clear that Google’s clean-room code did not copy Java’s 
implementing code (some minor items aside), and it is implementing code that 
does the “heavy lifting.”28 However, something significant was copied: to enable 
the Android platform to recognize what a third-party program might ask for, 
Google copied from Oracle’s Java program many of its method headers, and by 
necessary implication, some of Java’s selection and organization. 
For example, a particular small program in Java might function to compare 
two integers, and tell you which one is larger. An ordinary programmer writing an 
app might be able to easily write this program for herself, but it’s even easier to 
call on the Java program called MAX. A third-party programmer can call on 
thousands of such routines to save time – so long as the platform at which her 
program is aimed recognizes the “method headers” and inputs she has employed. 
Java’s slogan is “write once, run anywhere.”29 
																																								 																				
26 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (hereinafter 
“Oracle I”), rev’d Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F. 3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (hereinafter 
“Oracle II”).  
27 Patents as well as copyrights can exist in computer programs under today’s law. The extent of 
their eligibility for patent may be limited, however. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 
_U.S. _,134 S.Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014). 
28Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (hereinafter 
“Oracle I”), rev’d Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F. 3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (hereinafter 
“Oracle II”), quoted above in text accompanying note [30].  
29 Oracle, 750 F. 3d. at 1350. 
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Google wanted its programs for the Android platform to recognize the 
familiar identifying language. If instead of using the Java label “MAX” and its 
syntax, Google had given the Android subroutine that performed the same function 
a different name, like “LARGER,” then the Android platform would be 
significantly harder for the Java-accustomed programming community to use. That 
is, without the “method headers,” the third-party programmers would have found it 
more difficult to make their programs speak to Google’s (non-infringing) 
implementing code. Also, lacking the “method headers” would mean that the 
Android platform could not be backwards compatible with existing application 
programs that use Java – because when one of those programs needs a subroutine 
to find the larger of two integers, the program calls what it needs “MAX.” 
In order to compete on a level playing field with platforms running Java, 
therefore, Google needed not only to provide functionality as good as Java’s, but 
also needed its Android platform to recognize the known method headers and 
inputs (specified in Java’s declaration code) that identified functions that the third-
party programmers would want performed by Android’s new and noninfringing 
implementation code. 
In copying the headers, and making its own modules that mimicked Java 
functioning, Google also copied by necessity some organization from Java30. In 
particular, Google copied the selection of those functions that were important 
enough to be worth creating an implementation and header for them.31 
The District Court ruled that Google only copied uncopyrightable elements 
of Java, and found no infringement.32 On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit held 
																																								 																				
30 Organizational elements are sometimes treated as potentially copyrightable compilations. See 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the collection and assembling of 
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the 
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”) (Emphasis added). 
31 Oracle at 1350–1. 
32 Id. at 1350–1. 
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that the headers could have copyrights (as could their organizational structure), 
largely because many alternative ways to express and organize the headers33  had 
been open to Oracle’s34  programmers.  
In so holding, Federal Circuit rejected the persuasive power of a 1995 First 
Circuit decision, Lotus v. Borland.35 The cases posed similar issues. 
In Lotus, a challenger to the then-dominant spreadsheet program had created 
a fully independent spreadsheet program, one having its own implementation code.  
The new program also independently wrote its own structure of commands 36  
However, the newcomer program also allowed its users to trigger an optional 
interface that emulated the dominant spreadsheet’s command structure. Through 
the emulation interface, users switching from the established spreadsheet program 
to the new program could utilize their existing knowledge-base regarding 
keystrokes. In addition, many consumers had written macros to customize the 
earlier program to their purposes;37 such consumers could continue using their 
macros on the new program only through the emulation interface.  The emulator-- 
a copied set of commands ordered in a particular way -- made the users' existing 
macros interoperable with the new spreadsheet program. 
																																								 																				
33 See Oracle, 750 F. 3d at 1361 (“…merger cannot bar copyright protection for any lines of 
declaring source code unless Sun/Oracle had only one way, or a limited number of ways, to write 
them.”). 
34 By “Oracle” here, I also include Oracle’s predecessor in interest, Sun. It was Sun’s 
programmers who largely created Java. 
35 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided 
Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
36 Virtually all application programs have command hierarchies; as a common example, users 
might be instructed to hit the F key to open a "File" menu, on which the user might then find 
sub-commands such as "Save" or "Save As". 
37 Writing a macro enables a user to trigger a complicated sequence of commands by means of a 
simple keystroke combination. 
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                To make the emulation interface required the new program to copy 
both the command headers and some organization from the market leader. The 
latter company sued for copyright infringement, but lost. The First Circuit held that 
the copied commands and their hierarchy were “methods of operation.”38 Given the 
statutory command that “In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any . . . , method of operation . . .,”39 the First Circuit held 
that the command hierarchy could be copied.  Further, the court explained, “The 
fact that developers of the Lotus spreadsheet program could have designed its 
menu command hierarchy differently is immaterial to the question of whether the 
menu hierarchy is a “method of operation.” "40 
 As mentioned above, the Federal Circuit in Oracle v. Google 
vigorously disagreed with the Lotus analysis of copyrightability.41 The Oracle 
court instead ruled for plaintiff on this initial copyrightability issue,42 arguing that 
																																								 																				
38 Id. at 816. 
39 Id. at 815–6. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) is the cited statutory section; in full Section 102(b) states: “In 
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”  It is usually 
assumed that "ideas" and "concepts" are outside copyright because of free speech concerns (see 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); that "discover[ies]" are outside copyright because they 
are not original (see Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) 
(“facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship”); and that Congress put " system[s]" and 
"method[s] of operation" outside of copyright in order to maintain patent's dominance over 
functionality.   
40 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995) aff'd by an equally 
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
41 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
42 This ruling may not be determinative of the ultimate outcome, of course. Although the Federal 
Circuit’s decision reversed a decision that no copyright resided in the material copied from 
Oracle, copyrightability is only one of the relevant issues. A petition for certiorari having been 
turned down, 576 U.S. __ (2015), the case is being remanded. Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1339. 
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because all computer programs are methods of operation, adherence to the Lotus 
holding would deny copyright for all computer programs and thus frustrate 
Congressional intent.43 
It is on the copyrightability dispute between the First and Federal Circuits 
that the defendant Google relied in seeking Supreme Court review. Although cert 
was denied,44  it is useful to see how Google’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
framed the disputed question: 
Whether copyright protection extends to all elements of an original work of 
computer software, including a system or method of operation that an author could 
have written in more than one way.45 
These two views of copyrightability -- one upholding copyright when 
'alternative' expressions existed, and one refusing to look for 'alternatives' when 
faced with a method of operation-- also dominated discussion of Oracle.  Yet 
approaches to copyrightability need not determine the overall outcome of cases 
like Oracle and Lotus. 
Central to both Lotus46 and Oracle47 is the iconic Supreme Court case, Baker 
v. Selden.48 Despite the age of the opinion (Baker v. Selden dates from 1880), 
																																								 																				
43 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 576 U.S. 
__ (June 29, 2015) (No. 14–410), available at 
www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062915zor_4g25.pdf. 
44 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 576 U.S. 
__ (June 29, 2015) (No. 14–410), available at 
www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062915zor_4g25.pdf. 
45 Petition for Certiorari, Google, Inc. v. Oracle America, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), 
83 U.S.L.W. 3240 at i. (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14–410), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4113. 
46 Lotus, 49 F.4d. at 816–7. 
47 Lotus, 49 F.4d. at 816–7. 
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Baker was a primary focus of the Supreme Court’s questions during oral argument 
in Lotus,49 and conflicting views of Baker stood at the core of the Federal Circuit’s 
Oracle opinion and of the Oracle defendant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. As 
will appear below, Baker makes important rulings on copyrightability, but it also 
provides a new avenue (outside issues of copyrightability) for handling some 
software  
An irony 
Before examining the new avenue, let us note the parallel way the Federal 
Circuit handled the subject-matter issue in another area.  In trademark law, 
"functional" shapes are ineligible for trade dress protection, for the same reasons of 
patent -deference that limit the reach of copyright.50 Defining "functionality" has of 
course been the subject of much litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court in TrafFix v. 
MDR51 ruled that the availability of alternative product shapes could not “save” an 
otherwise functional shape from being unsuitable subject matter for trademark 
ownership.52  The Federal Circuit responded to TrafFix essentially by taking 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
48 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). (Much of the secondary literature gives the opinion’s 
date as 1879. Although the case was argued in 1879, the opinion came down in 1880). 
49The oral argument is available at www.oyez.org/cases/1990–1999/1995/1995_94_2003 
50 The core of trademark law is “distinctiveness as to source.” Protection for product shapes on 
the ground of “distinctiveness” is called “trade dress.” No form of trade dress protection is 
permitted for functional configurations. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Qualitex v. Jacobson 
Products, 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (“The functionality doctrine … forbids the use of a product’s 
feature as a trademark where doing so will put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because 
the feature is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or “affects its cost or quality.” [citing 
Inwood Labs v. Ives Labs, 456 U.S. 844, 851, fn. 10 (1982)]”). 
51 TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
52 Id. at 25. 
The Fifth Circuit case Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz Gmbh v. Ritter Gmbh well illustrates the 
TrafFix approach. In Eppendorf, a syringe had a flange that was supported against deformation 
by a particular design for fins. The plaintiff sought trade dress protection for the fins as 
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evasive maneuvers, saving questionable trademark rights in functional product 
shapes by re-introducing “the availability of alternatives.”53 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
distinctive and nonfunctional trade dress, relying on expert testimony indicating that many 
different fin designs-- many alternatives -- could have supported the flange. The particular design 
was nevertheless held ineligible for trademark protection. Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz Gmbh v. 
Ritter Gmbh, 289 F.3d 351, 357–8 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Eppendorf’s experts concede that fins of 
some shape, size or number are necessary to provide support for the flange and to prevent 
deformation of the product. … [T]hey are functional as a matter of law. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33–
34.") (Emphasis added.) The juridical irrelevance of alternative flange designs could not be more 
obvious. 
Copyright uses a similar approach in the “separability” hurdle that useful three-dimensional 
articles must surmount in order to obtain copyright. Thus, when the Second Circuit denied 
copyright to sculpted mannequins used for clothing displays, the court did not ask whether the 
sculpted torsos could have been shaped differently. Instead, the Court looked at the shapes as 
they existed. Since all the elements served a function, no elements survived the separability 
inquiry. Thus, despite the obvious possibility of sculpting torsos differently, there was nothing to 
which a copyright could attach: 
[T]he features claimed to be aesthetic or artistic, e.g., the life-size configuration of the breasts 
and the width of the shoulders, are inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the 
display of clothes. [A] model of a human torso, in order to serve its utilitarian function, must 
have some configuration of the chest and some width of shoulders… 
Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985). Although courts 
vary in their definitions of “separability,” no court will give copyright to a useful product shape 
simply because alternative shapes exist. One court seems to be flirting with including some 
consideration of alternatives into "separability", Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 
372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004), but even that court's dominant inquiry is not "alternatives". Its 
focus is on the degree to which the design process was free of "utilitarian pressures". 
The separability test – more demanding than the “merger” test that also denies copyright to 
works of authorship – is mandated by the definition of sculptural works in the statute. See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works”). 
53 See Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See 1-2A 
Gilson on Trademarks § 2A.04 (“The Federal Circuit believes its pre-TrafFix test is still good 
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So when in Oracle the Federal Circuit took the same route as it had in 
trademark – validating non-patent rights over functional subject matter by asking 
“are alternatives possible?” –it perhaps should not have been surprising. The 
chapter will suggest that much as the Federal Circuit attempted to evade the full 
import of the Supreme Court’s TrafFix opinion for functionality in trademark law, 
the Federal Circuit in Oracle now attempts to evade the full import of the Supreme 
Court’s Baker opinion for functionality in copyright. 
3 Copyright Uses and Patent Uses: Baker v. Selden 
As mentioned, the core Supreme Court case on functional use of copyrighted 
works is Baker v. Selden.54 Despite being over 200 years old, the opinion was 
relied on both by the Lotus55 and Oracle decisions.56  The case involved the 
copying of accounting forms. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
law and continues to use its Morton-Norwich analysis that recognizes evidence of alternative 
designs as “part of the overall mix. … The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board follows the 
Federal Circuit …”)  
A better ground for trying to narrow TrafFix might have been to argue that the TrafFix approach 
should apply only to product features which, like the dual-spring device at issue in TrafFix, had 
previously been protected by a now-expired utility patent.  I would argue that such a narrowing, 
too, is questionable. (The Fifth Circuit, for example, applies the TrafFix approach to defining 
trademark’s functionality bar without any hint the approach should be limited to those features 
that had been previously protected by a utility patent. See Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz Gmbh v. 
Ritter Gmbh, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002).)  But least such a position would have had some 
plausible textual support.  Presumably the Federal Circuit did not adopt this more plausible 
position because it would have bound the Circuit to follow the Supreme Court at least in cases 
involving expired patents. 
54 Baker, 101 U.S. 99 (1800). 
55 Baker v. Selden is discussed both by the majority, 49 F.3d 807 at 813-17, and by the 
concurrence, 49 F.3d 807 at 819. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, (1st Cir. 
1995) aff'd, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) 
56 Oracle II at 1355-57. 
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3.1 Introducing Baker v. Selden 
Selden’s widow and administratrix, as plaintiff, asserted copyright in a 
number of books that both explained and illustrated the decedent’s supposedly 
novel method of bookkeeping. The Selden method enabled an accountant to use 
fewer volumes and work more expeditiously. Baker was alleged to have copied 
accounting forms from Selden’s books, for sale en masse to accountants. Baker’s 
forms differed somewhat from Selden’s, but the litigants’ focus was not on how 
similar or different the forms might have been. Rather, their focus was on whether 
Baker’s forms enabled accountants to reach the same practical results via the same 
system as did Selden’s.57 
     The Supreme Court was concerned lest copyright allow an end-run 
around the requirements imposed by patent law. Patents are secured only by prior 
review and must be registered to give the public notice of their content; copyrights 
arise without either necessity. Patents last a short time; copyrights remain 
assertable for decades longer. Patents are supposed to issue only upon passing 
rigorous tests of novelty and nonobviousness; copyrights arise in virtually any 
doodle, letter home from camp, or amateur recording of street noise.  In now-
classic language, the Court wrote: 
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described 
therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would 
be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not 
of copyright. … The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit 
of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object 
of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be secured 
by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters 
patent.58 
																																								 																				
57 Id. at 101 (“The evidence of the complainant is principally directed to the object of showing 
that Baker uses the same system as that which is explained and illustrated in Selden’s books.”). 
58 Id. at 102, 105. 
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So the functional system or other useful art could not be copyrighted, even 
though copyright could subsist in the textual explanation or pictorial illustration of 
the art.     
        But this conclusion did not necessarily leave a work with functional 
goals without copyright altogether.  A copyright might lose its force as against 
some forms of copying and yet retain its force against others. The kind of use 
makes a difference: a diagram that is a "necessary incident" to a system can be 
used freely by the public for "purposes of practical application" but not "for the 
purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the art".59 This distinction has 
become known as the “use/explanation" doctrine.60  
The best-known result of the Baker Court's concern with keeping copyright 
from interfering with patent law was Baker's holding that systems could not be 
copyrightable. But copyrightability is only one of copyright's dimensions; another 
is the nature of the 'exclusive rights' a copyright owner is granted.61  Baker v. 
																																								 																				
59 Id at 103.  The Court writes, similarly, that, "[W]hilst no one has a right to print or publish his 
book, or any material part thereof, as a book intended to convey   instruction in the art, any 
person may practice and use the art itself which he has described and illustrated therein.  . . . 
And, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines and headings of accounts must necessarily be 
used as incident to it." Id. at 104. 
60 As the reader may have noticed, the name of the doctrine comes from a portion of the opinion 
that is a bit inapposite, as the portion focuses more on copyrightability than on the scope of 
exclusive right: 
 "The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no 
foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object 
of the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it 
can be secured at all, by letters-patent."   
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105. 
61 Copyright has essentially three dimensions:  duration (has the copyright expired?), subject 
matter (is the work original, fixed in a tangible medium, and a protectable type of authorship?), 
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Selden operated in both dimensions: the opinion posited that even when a valid 
copyright existed, deference to patent would place limits on the scope of a 
copyright owner’s rights.62 That second aspect of Baker, the aspect dealing not 
with copyrightability but with scope of right, is this chapter's main topic.  
Baker and its progeny distinguish between two types of behaviors that 
employ created works: uses that are suitable for copyright regulation, and uses that 
should be regulated solely by patent law. Baker's ruling that copyright owners do 
not have the same rights to control each type63 of behavior, provides another 
avenue for examining copying in suits like Oracle v. Google. This new avenue 
focuses on limiting a copyright owner’s rights over functional use rather than on 
denying copyright to functional subject matter.64 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
and exclusive right (is the defendant accused of a behavior over which the copyright owner has 
an exclusive right?)   
62 There is an identity between the “rights” of the owner and the “uses” that the owner controls. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting to copyright owner exclusive rights to control use of the 
work via reproduction, use of the work via public performance, use of the work via public 
display, and so on.) 
63 Baker, 101 U.S. at 102. 
64 At the risk of blurring definitional boundaries, it should be noted that many subject-matter 
questions can be stated in terms of exclusive rights, and vice versa.  For example, one could say, 
equally, that "systems are not copyrightable" or that ""copyright owners have no right to control 
the functional copying of their systems."   
 
The point at issue in this chapter is whether Baker can allow the public to engage in some 
functional use of a program (say, uses which are 'purely' nonexpressive) while allowing the 
computer program author to retain copyright control over other uses.   
 
It's easy to interpret Baker as requiring complete denial of copyright -- after all, the opinion does 
say, "The conclusion to which we have come is, that blank account-books are not the subject of 
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     At first glance this approach from Baker may seem as broad in its impact 
as the Lotus decision that held computer-program command structures 
uncopyrightable. However, as this chapter shows below, the approach need not 
imperil the overall copyrightability of computer programs, and would not eliminate 
all ability of computer-program copyright owners to bring suit against 
economically significant use.65 The “rights” approach from Baker instead draws 
some helpful lines – and note that the approach has nothing to do with 
“alternatives”, which had been key to the Oracle court's decision in favor of 
plaintiff. 
3.1 Significance 
Had the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden enabled copyright owners to 
control functional uses of the utilitarian systems or devices their copyrighted works 
portray, a welter of unregistered private rights lasting far longer than patents and 
easier to obtain than patents would be awarded over utilitarian subject matters 
regardless of whether they met patentable standards.  Baker v. Selden marks the 
place where resistance to the confluence of patent and copyright law first took 
mature form.66  
Prior to that 1880 decision, designers of systems who could somehow 
ground those systems in graphic art had plausible claims to copyright. For 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
copyright."  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107.   But much of the opinion leans toward a less 
sweeping invalidation. 
 
65 This fear was expressed by the Oracle II court. Oracle 750 F.3d at 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
66 In my analysis of Baker, I am indebted to the work of Pamela Samuelson, particularly Pamela 
Samuelson, Symposium: Frontiers of intellectual Property: Why Copyright Law Excludes 
Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1921 (hereinafter 
“Systems and Processes”); and Pamela Samuelson, Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction 
between Authorship and Invention, in Intellectual Property Stories (Jane C. Ginsburg and 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, eds., 2006). 
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example, some years before Baker¸ a case arose involving copyright in dressmaker 
patterns.67 (Dressmaker patterns are two-dimensional paper drawings meant to be 
pinned on fabric to guide a tailor’s shears.)68 The plaintiff successfully enjoined 
unauthorized garment patterns that, though not identical, achieved the “same 
result” in terms of producing the same finished clothing.69 
In 1880 that changed. After Baker v. Selden, courts continually rejected 
efforts to argue that similarity in system and practical result70 could justify a 
judgment of copyright infringement.71   
3.2. Baker and “merger”  
   The “merger” doctrine aims to preserve the public’s liberty to use abstract 
ideas by preventing copyright from arising in a work of expression that is one of 
																																								 																				
67 Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113 (C.C.S.D. 1862) 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 After discussing various similarities and differences in appearance, as between plaintiff’s work 
and defendant’s, the court in Drury opined: 
But there is one fact that seems wholly conclusive on this question of identity, and dispenses 
with the necessity of a minute inquiry into the alleged discrepancies between the two plans. 
Some nine or ten witnesses, practical and intelligent dressmakers, well acquainted with the 
theory and practice of taking measurements, and cutting dresses upon the plan of these parties, 
testify that the two are substantially the same, and in practice produce the same result. Some of 
these witnesses swear they have cut dresses by both plans, and that when the directions of each 
are strictly pursued, the results are substantially the same. 
… Mrs. Ewing has, with some adroitness, so arranged and transposed some parts of Mrs. Drury’s 
diagrams as to present to the unexperienced eye the impression that they are dissimilar, but in 
doing this she has utterly failed to prove that there is any difference in the principle of the two. 
Drury, 7 F. Cas. at 1117 (emphasis added). 
71 See, e.g., the cases reviewed infra at Section __. 
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very few ways to convey the abstraction.  If few or no alternative forms exist, then 
the particular form of expression is said to “merge” with the unprotectable idea, 
and the expression too becomes incapable of being owned under copyright law. 
 “Merger” is a troublesome doctrine, but it has some legitimacy when 
employed to keep copyright from locking up general and abstract ideas. The 
Oracle court took “merger” and applied it instead to functional innovation.   
Because the contested elements of the Java program could have been written in 
alternative ways, the Federal Circuit held, those elements were capable of 
sustaining a copyright.72 
The Federal Circuit is not alone in using the possibility of alternatives to 
justify giving non-patent protection to a functional innovation.  Yet the application 
of “merger” in such contexts is neither mandated nor explicitly approved by any 
legislation, and no court has articulated a clear rationale for taking the step.  
Further, much U.S. legislation and precedent would seem to weigh against 
seeing “merger” and its inquiry into “alternatives” as an appropriate tool for 
defining appropriate borders between copyright and patent law. For example, 
consider the requirements for protection in the law of utility patent.   Patent 
applicants must show “utility,” “novelty,” and ‘non-obviousness,” but applicants 
need not prove that their invention is superior to other ways of accomplishing a 
goal.73  The presence of “alternatives” does not doom eligibility for federal patent 
protection. 
Patents exist in many different riding lawn-mowers, for example, without 
any of the manufacturers needing to prove that their own mower possesses 
																																								 																				
72 Oracle II at 1361. 
73 See, e.g., 1-4 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.01 (2015) (“To comply with the utility requirement, an 
invention need not be superior to existing products or processes.”). 
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elements so unique that no other product can serve as an adequate alternative.  
Sometimes, therefore, simply being different can suffice for a patent.74 
This is a sensible decision for Congress to have made.  Judgments of product 
superiority or uniqueness are vulnerable, 75 and characteristics that make an 
innovation merely different today might make it uniquely important later. 
Monetary value, for example, is largely a matter of context, so that price and cost 
attributable to varying combinations of elements will alter over time as constraints 
and needs alter. 
From the fact that Congress permits patents to be granted in innovations that 
have alternatives, it would seem to follow that such innovations have at least some 
																																								 																				
74 Some qualifications are in order.  For example, in determining whether or not an innovation is 
non-obvious, courts sometimes use look to secondary evidence such as whether others in the 
field have long failed to “solve the problem.” Id. at § 5.05.  Other secondary criteria include, 
inter alia, length of unmet need, or (most controversially) the presence of commercial success. 
Id.  As a matter of logic, an innovation with no existing alternatives will do better on measures 
like ‘unmet need’ and ‘unsolved problem’ than can an innovation that already has alternatives on 
the market.  Similarly, an innovation that may not have alternatives on the market now, but for 
which potential alternatives can be easily imagined, may well fare poorly on measures such as 
commercial success.   The presence of actual or potential alternatives may, therefore, make some 
kind of difference to the likelihood that a patent will be awarded. 
75 Thus, the Tenth Circuit argues: 
 
[T]he framers of the patent system did not require an inventor to demonstrate an 
invention's superiority to existing products in order to qualify for a patent. That they did 
not do so tells us that the patent system seeks not only superior inventions but also a 
multiplicity of inventions. A variety of choices is more likely to satisfy the desires of a 
greater number of consumers than is a single set of products deemed “optimal” in some 
average sense by patent examiners and/or judges. And the ability to intermingle and 
extrapolate from many inventors' solutions to the same problem is more likely to lead to 
further technological advances than is a single, linear approach seeking to advance one 
“superior” line of research and development. 
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996). 
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significance.76  If so, it is quite arguable that the law should avoid undermining 
innovators’ willingness to embrace the costly patent system (with its rigorous 
standards, disclosure requirements, and short duration) for such innovations.  The 
patent system loses much of its appeal if an innovator can bypass it to employ a 
regime like copyright.  (Although an owner’s rights under copyright are a bit less 
strong than an owner’s rights under patent law, copyright is still tempting: 77 
copyrights are granted for immensely long terms of private control, are largely free 
of required requirement of disclosure,78 and arise under fairly easy standards of 
acquisition.) In addition, many of Congress’s decisions, such as the patent rule that 
only ‘novel’ and ‘non-obvious’ functional innovations should be privatized,79 will 
be disregarded if courts uphold copyrights in common and obvious functional 
variations.  
																																								 																				
 
77 Some readers may object that this should be parsed more closely. They might point out, for 
example, that the Supreme Court has indicated that, for innovations clearly ineligible for patents, 
allowing states to provide alternative routes to privatization would neither reduce the number of 
federal patent applications nor the amount of disclosure produced by the federal patent system.   
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U. S. 470, 485 (1974) (refusing to pre-empt state trade 
secrecy law).  Kewanee’s logic is, however, questionable on its own terms and inapplicable here.   
     One of the difficulties with Kewanee’s interior logic is the real possibility that diminishing the 
level of disclosure produced by the patent office might be a lesser problem than the impairment 
of free competition resulting from non-patent protection. If so, asking how state protections 
would impact on the number of federal patent applicants would be beside the main point. 
     More importantly for this chapter is that Kewanee’s focus on the differential likelihoods of 
patenting various innovations is largely irrelevant to the “merger” search for alternatives.  
Whether or not an innovation has alternatives does not directly correlate with whether or not the 
innovation could obtain a federal utility patent. 
78 All patent applications must disclose their inventions.  Copyright Office regulations, by 
contrast, allow the registrants of computer software to hide most of the code from public view.  
See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 1509.1(C) (4) (b) (3d ed. 2014) (Computer Programs 
That Contain Trade Secret Material). 
79 The dangers of too much privatization include, inter alia, excessive deadweight loss, and this 
cost applies to innovations whether or not they are potentially patentable.   
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3.3 Patent law is a jealous monarch 
In several cases construing the pre-emptive reach of federal patent law, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has stated that a functional configuration that is known to the 
public and is unprotected by utility patent or design patent should not be able to 
find protection under the wings of non-patent regimes.80  Functional products that 
patent law does not protect (whether because a product fails to meet standards such 
as nonobviousness or novelty,81 or because its patent has expired82) become 
governed by the patent public domain, and in that domain, patent law gives rights 
“to copy and to use”.83  It is as if patent law were a monarch who has declared that 
any product she has freed must remain free of subordinate sovereigns as well. 
 To crown patent law the chief monarch over functionality makes 
considerable sense. Federal copyright84 and federal trademark law85 both contain 
																																								 																				
80 At first the courts spoke as if patent and copyright were to be given similarly broad pre-
emptive effect.  See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 367 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) 
(“ when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to 
copy that article.”)   Over time, however, the patent and copyright cases were given different 
treatment. Although in many areas the patent statute was understood to have drawn “a balance” 
between protection and public domain to which states were required to defer, the 1909 Copyright 
Act by contrast was interpreted as leaving significant topics as to which “Congress has drawn no 
balance.” Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 570- 71 (1973) (declining to pre-empt California 
provision that prohibited the copying of sound recordings).   
81 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226, n.1 (1964) (reiterating a District Court 
finding that Stiffel’s lamp patent was “invalid for want of invention”—a holding that Stiffel did 
not challenge on appeal). 
82 TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 25 (2001) (configuration for which trade 
dress protection was sought had been previously been protected by patent). 
83 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989) (quoting Compco Corp. v. 
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 367 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).) 
84 In the copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) puts systems, methods of operation, and 
processes fully outside copyright protection; in other provisions (such as § 113(b), or the 
definition of PGS work in § 101), the statute actively prevents copyrights from arising, or 
deprives copyright owners of otherwise-applicable rights, where copyright could interfere with  
patent law’s public domain.  
85 Under the federal Lanham Act, trademarks cannot be functional; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), 
1125(a) (3) (2012).  The language is not self-defining, however, and many courts distinguish 
between ‘de jure functionality” which permits protection under the Lanham Act, and “de facto” 
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provisions that decline to protect functional innovations and designs. Moreover, it 
is in the patent statutes that Congress seems to have embodied its most attentive 
consideration to questions of how functional innovations should be treated.  
 I concede that this ‘jealous monarch’ view of patent law is not 
unanimously held, particularly in regard to patent/copyright relations. First, the 
Supremacy Clause undergirds the pre-emption cases, and the Clause is irrelevant to 
interactions between two federal regimes like copyright and patent.86 Second, the 
copyright and trademark statutes have been interpreted in various ways, sometimes 
but not consistently hostile to courts that inquire into a functional product’s 
“alternatives”87 en route to deciding whether or not to allow non-patent protection.  
So the monarchal view of patent law does not reign unopposed within courts 
interpreting its sister statutes.  Third, pre-emption cases themselves fluctuate in the 
strength they attribute to patent’s public domain.88  
Nevertheless, the pre-emption cases have a clear central line of argument, 
and the federal statutes for both copyright and trademark consistently defer to 
patent law for reasons best explained (in terms of both logic and history) by the 
same approach: namely, that only through patent law should duties be imposed that 
require the public not to duplicate or sell innovative functional products. After all, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
functionality that just happens to exist. The Supreme Court’s most recent opinion on the topic, 
TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001), sensibly ignores the labels of de jure and 
de facto functionality, and in so doing seems to unite the two categories. The TrafFix Court held 
that the possibility of alternative product shapes could not justify giving federal trade dress 
protection to a shape that was otherwise functional. Id. at 25. 
86 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989) (Florida statute prohibiting 
certain modes of copying boat designs held inconsistent with the patent public domain and thus 
pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause). 
87 The Supreme Court has criticized using an inquiry into ‘alternatives’ to decide whether a 
product shape is ineligible for protection under federal trademark law, TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. 
Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001), and the Federal Circuit has resisted. See section 11.2.1, supra. 
88 Compare for example the breadth of pre-emptive sweep in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (pre-empting state protection for certain trade dress) with the 
convoluted logic of Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U. S. 470, 485 (1974) (not pre-
empting state protection for trade secrets.) 
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non-patent laws that privatize intellectual products have potential to undermine 
patent law’s balance between competition and monopoly whether the laws are 
federal or state. 
In the pre-emption area, at least one classic case makes it clear that state 
protection is forbidden not only for unique advances, but also for products that 
have alternatives. Thus, the Supreme Court wrote: 
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made 
in some other way, that the design is . . .  not essential to the use 
of either article, . . . that there may be 'confusion'  among 
purchasers as to which article is which or as to who is the 
maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a State's law 
requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and regardless 
of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others can 
furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the 
actual acts of copying and selling.89 
This approach to the patent public domain leaves no room for a 
doctrine like “merger”. 
Conceivably, a justification could be constructed for restricting the logic of 
the pre-emption cases to assessing solely the validity of state laws.  The 
justification might also stretch to defending the practice of courts’ employing 
“merger” to justify privatizing functional but unpatented products under federal 
copyright and federal trademark laws.  Perhaps one could argue, for example, that 
patent law’s public domain should defer more to cognate federal laws (such as 
federal copyright and federal trademark) than it does to states’ attempts to create 
																																								 																				
89 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964). The Supreme Court has 
admittedly withdrawn from some of the statements in Compco and its companion case Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).  In my view the later cases do not impair the 
core policy of requiring other laws to respect patent law’s limits on protection. The most difficult 
case for my position is Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U. S. 470 (1974), but its result is 
explicable:  I think that in Kewanee trade secrecy survived the pre-emption attack for reasons not 
rooted in logic but in practical administration of the law: it was obvious that Congress had not 
intended to create such a significant disruption in local commercial law. 
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intellectual property. But such an argument would need to go much further than 
pointing out that the Supremacy Clause has no purchase over intra-federal 
relations; such a formalistic reply would ignore the fact that when ether federal or 
state law grants exclusivity in functional products outside of patent, those grants 
can have very serious real world effects.   
In sum: patent law makes nothing turn on the difference between 
innovations that have alternatives and those that do not, and copyright and 
trademark states both defer to patent law.  Therefore it should at least surprise us 
when a court allows copyright or trademark claims to arise in an original or 
distinctive functional product simply because the product passes something like a 
“merger” test of having competitive alternatives. But that is what the Oracle court 
did, and it is what other courts sometimes do as well.   
The historic origins of this practice cannot be fully untangled here. 
Nevertheless the instant chapter does hope to accomplish two things.  The first 
goal is to make vivid why it is problematic for courts to use the search for 
alternatives as if were a sensible or natural tool – one that needs no explanation or 
justification-- to resolve tensions between patent law and other cognate doctrines. I 
hope that goal has been accomplished.  
The second goal to make clear that the legal community should stop 
attributing to Baker the mess that is “merger.”  It is to that task that the chapter 
now turns. 
3.4  Baker v. Selden neither gave birth to, nor legitimates, the use of “merger” in 
the context of functionality 
To recap:  The "merger" doctrine aims to preserve the public’s liberty to use 
ideas by preventing copyright from arising in a work of expression that is one of 
very few ways to convey the abstraction. "Merger" is the basic approach used by 
the Oracle court; because the programs might have done their work if written 
differently, the Federal Circuit upheld their copyrightability.  This misapplication 
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of “merger” results in part from the way that some jurists, perhaps including some 
on the Federal Circuit, 90 see Baker v. Selden as the foundation for “merger.”  
But that reading blurs the line between the reasons why no copyright can 
inhere in ‘abstract ideas’ (which merger addresses) and why no copyright can 
inhere in ‘functional systems’ (which are addressed by Baker and a host of ‘useful 
article’ and ‘functionality’ doctrines).  Regarding abstract ideas, copyright puts 
them in the public domain for virtually all purposes, but as for systems and 
methods of operation, copyright ‘channels’ them toward patent law.91 Under 
Baker, patent law and its ‘rights to copy and to use’92 unpatented innovations seem 
to have a particularly strong magnetic force. 
 Admittedly the Baker v. Selden opinion contains language about the 
'necessity' of using Selden's forms -- language which some have interpreted as the 
Court assuming that few alternative accounting forms would do the job. But the 
relevant passage is not a finding of fact, and is best explicable on purely rhetorical 
grounds.93 More importantly, the same passage indicates that even 'necessary' 
																																								 																				
90 Oracle II at 1355. 
91 For a useful discussion of pitfalls and opportunities in current methods of channeling IP 
producers to different legal doctrines, see Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to 
Channeling?, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 873 (2009). 
92 This language, while applicable in spirit, I quote from a case decided much later than Baker. 
Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989). 
93 It is true that the Baker opinion said that “where the art [that a book] teaches cannot be used 
without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to 
them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and 
given therewith to the public.” Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1800). That language is 
sometimes interpreted to indicate that the Court believed that few or no alternatives existed to the 
plaintiff’s accounting form. But that language was not a factual finding. 
Rather, it was a reply to the earlier claim by plaintiff’s lawyer that his client owned the system 
precisely because (he alleged) the forms were necessary to the system’s use. (“It is contended [by 
plaintiff] that he has secured such exclusive right because no one can use the system without 
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forms will be infringed when they are copied in "publication in other works 
explanatory of the art." 94  The passage therefore is not addressing copyrightability 
at all. 
Whether or not the 'merger' doctrine is capable of safeguarding the public 
domain status of abstract ideas, abstract ideas were not the Court's concern in 
Baker. As intimated above, abstract ideas and patentable inventions lie outside 
copyright for non-identical sets of reasons.  The Baker Court's concern was to keep 
an overgenerous application of copyright law from undermining inventors' reasons 
to seek the protection of patent law.  Congress had not chosen copyright (with its 
long term and ease of acquisition) to govern functional innovation; Congress gave 
that task to patent law, a realm marked by short duration, requirements of 
disclosure, and high standards that a government agent needed to be persuaded 
were satisfied.95          
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
using substantially the same ruled lines and headings which he was appended to his books in 
illustration of it. In other words, it is contended that the ruled lines and headings, given to 
illustrate the system, are a part of the book, and as such are secured by the copyright, and that no 
one can make or use similar ruled lines and headings, or ruled lines and headings made and 
arranged on substantially the same system, without violating the copyright.” Id. at 101). 
As I see it, the Court was merely turning the copyright claimant’s rhetoric on its head. The 
claimant’s lawyer had pointed to an alleged interdependence of the accounting system and the 
accounting forms. The lawyer had argued that the forms (a set of drawings) were necessary to 
the system, and that therefore the drawings’ eligibility for copyright should make copyright 
apply to the system as well. The Court replied in kind.  If such interdependence existed, the 
Court ruled, such that the drawings were necessary to the system, then it was the system’s 
ineligibility for copyright that would apply to both.  
For other reasons why the “merger” interpretation of Baker is incorrect, the best guide is Pamela 
Samuelson, whose scholarship is cited throughout below. 
94 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 
95  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) 
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4. Defining "Explanation" and "Use" 
The discussion to this point has suggested that, under Baker, the owners of 
copyright in literary and graphic works cannot employ their rights to control all 
forms of copying. Some copying is functional, and lies within the public’s freedom 
of action unless restrained by some law other than copyright. Thus a copyright 
owner can have rights against some copying but not others: a liberty to copy can be 
given the public "for the purpose of practical application. …"96, while, by contrast, 
copying done "for the purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the 
art"97 could result in infringement.  This dichotomy between infringing and 
noninfringing uses98  has of course become known as the “use/explanation” 
distinction or the “use/explanation” doctrine. 
      The “use/explanation” nomenclature is fairly unhelpful. Everything done 
with a copyrighted work is in some sense a “use,” so the “use” half of the term is 
less a description than a gesture: a hand waved toward the realm of utility patents. 
As for the other half of the phrase, “explanation,” copying for explanation is 
obviously exemplary rather than exhaustive of the many kinds of copying behavior 
that copyright law can legitimately regulate.  Scholars sometimes use the term 
“non-functional” to label the behaviors that copyright can regulate without 
imperiling patent law. (This chapter also sometimes employs “non-functional” in 
this way.)  
																																								 																				
96 101 U.S. 103. 
97 Id. 
98 This dichotomy could be equivalently expressed.  Where an owner has rights against copying, 
the public has duties-not-to-copy (for ‘duties’ are correlative to ‘rights’); where an owner lacks 
rights against copying, the public has a privilege or liberty to copy (for liberties are correlative to 
an absence of exclusive right in opposing parties). This vocabulary, which can be quite useful, 
finds its origin with Hohfeld.  Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays (1919). 
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     But “non-functional”, too, is mere term-of-art shorthand and, in the end, 
inaccurate in the context of ordinary language. Behaviors unquestionably within 
copyright’s legitimate sphere (such as copying a work verbatim into one's blog) 
can serve “functions” such as educating one’s readers, or advertising one’s own 
skills, that are as important as many “functions” served by patented inventions. 
So what are the behaviors beyond “explanation” that can properly controlled 
by copyright? Baker has some suggestive answers, as does the contemporary 
copyright statute. 
     First, regarding literary or graphic works that convey the “teachings of 
science,” Baker tells us that it is only use of the expressive aspect that copyright 
can enforce. When scientific and practical teachings are "embodied and taught in a 
literary composition or book, their essence consists only in their statement. This 
alone is what is secured by the copyright. The use by another of the same methods 
of statement, whether in words or illustrations, in a book published for teaching the 
art would undoubtedly be an infringement of the copyright."99  Legislative history 
tells us that Congress considered “expressiveness” the basis for copyright even for 
computer programs.100  So a use on the copyright side of the line is a use that draws 
on the expressive aspects of a work. 
																																								 																				
99 Id. at 104 (emphasis added). 
100 When Congress adopted copyright for computer programs, expressiveness was key. To quote 
from the legislative history, using emphasis supplied by the Oracle I court: 
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend protection 
to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the “writing” 
expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the 
expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and 
that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the 
copyright law. 
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The Baker opinion also provides some helpful examples. Not only can 
copyright infringement result from copying for “publication in other works 
explanatory of the art”,101 the Court tells us; infringement also can arise as a result 
of copying the “lines of the poet or the historian’s periods”102 and from copying 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection under the 
present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the new single Federal system of 
copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged. 
H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 56–7 (1976) (emphasis added). 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2012) rev’d and remanded, 
750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis altered; footnote omitted). 
This reliance on expressiveness also appears in the rationale for the 1980 amendments. The 
recommendations on which Congress relied in 1980 depended on the division between “the 
copyrightable element of style and expression in a computer program and the process which 
underlies it.” Final Report of the National Commission on New Technology Uses of Copyrighted 
Works (hereinafter, “CONTU”) (1978) at 22. In 1980, Congress essentially adopted the CONTU 
recommendations. 
101 Id at 104–5. 
102 Id. at 104. 
Robert Bone has suggested that the Baker court was trying to distinguish between different kinds 
of works – those susceptible only to expression-oriented behaviors of the kinds with which 
copyright has traditionally been concerned, and those works that are susceptible to functional 
application of the kinds with which that patent law has traditionally been concerned.  It is 
possible that, as Professor Bone suggests, the Court may be making a teleological subject-matter 
distinction here, namely, that works of a particular type (poetry, history, pictures “addressed to 
the taste”) simply have no conceivable “functions” or “uses” about which patent law should be 
concerned. But even so, the Court’s root concern would seem to be with types of use. 
One need not go so far as to eliminate copyrightability in order to shelter the public’s freedom to 
use functional aspects of a copyrighted work in a functional way. 
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works of authorship whose only goal is to serve aesthetic “taste”103 or the 
“production of pleasure in the [] contemplation” of “form.”104   
 So it does not count as utilitarian "use" to produce pleasure through 
aesthetics and contemplation. To produce pleasure through designing a tickling 
machine would be another story. 
    It can be as difficult to define what counts as a patent-type "use" as it was 
to define a copyright-type "explanation".  Yet it is important to identify what kinds 
of purposes (described with whatever specificity is possible) might suffice to 
activate patent's magnetic force so strongly that patent's influence makes an act of 
reproduction noninfringing under copyright law.  
     We might start by distinguishing expressive from non-expressive uses.105  
However, Baker does not address all nonexpressive uses; Baker addresses only one 
subset, namely, copying behavior that lies within the domain of patent law's proper 
concern.  Does patent law provide answers?  Unfortunately not; patent law's notion 
of 'utility' is too vague to assist and hardly self-defining.  Is there some other 
source of criteria for  identifying patent-type "use", or for identifying (something 
not quite its converse) the kind of "use" for which copyright is not the proper 
regulator?   
																																								 																				
103 Baker, 101 U.S. at 104. 
104 The Court noted, “[T]hese observations are not intended to apply to ornamental designs, or 
pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste. Of these it may be said, that their form is their 
essence, and their object, the production of pleasure in their contemplation.” Baker, 101 U.S.at 
103–4 (1880). 
105 By contrast, Abraham Drassinower's view of Baker does begin with a distinction between 
communicative and non-communicative use.  See the discussion of Drassinower's view infra at 
___. 
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    One potential source is the contemporary statutory concept of “useful 
article.”106 The phrase and its definition appear in the 1976 Copyright Act. 
      Coming into the mid-seventies, Congress was considering the latest of a 
series of copyright reform bills. When the House received the bill containing what 
soon became the new Copyright Act, part of the bill ("Title II") was  a set of sui 
generis rules granting design protection for 'applied art' such as the attractive 
design of autos, appliances and furniture.  The House jettisoned Title II. It did so in 
part because of concerns about monopoly.107  
     The entitlements given by Copyright are even stronger than the sui 
generis right that Congress had declined to create, and thus copyright posed more 
danger of monopoly than the rejected right.  It is natural that the Copyright Act of 
1976 would thus leave, as it did, a wide moat of public-domain liberty around 
objects that meld form and function. This public-protective ring is embodied not 
only through narrowing the copyrightability of PGS useful articles.108  The statute 
																																								 																				
106 17 USC section 202 (definition of 'useful article') (2012). 
107 In dropping the design-protection portion of the bill, Title II, the House Report gave among 
its reasons the following: 
"[T]he Committee will have to examine further the assertion of the Department of Justice, which 
testified in opposition to the Title, that Title II would create a new monopoly which has not been 
justified by a showing that its benefits will outweigh the disadvantage of removing such designs 
from free public use."   
H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476 (hereinafter “1976 House Report”) at 49-50 (1976), available at 
www.copyright.gov/history/law/clrev_94-1476.pdf. 
 
108 Useful articles that seek protection as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works (“PGS” works) 
must meet a demanding “separability” test: 
[t]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, 
or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, 
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also limits the exclusive rights that attach to any copyrights that portray useful 
articles- the copyright owner's rights do not control what Baker called "use".109    
We might, accordingly, find some hints to fill out Baker's distinction 
between “use” and “explanation” in the current statute’s definition of “useful 
article.”  The definition reads as follows: 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works”). 
In my view, the “best” account of separability is that advanced by Paul Goldstein. The key, as he 
indicates, is whether forbidding competitors to copy the copyrighted portion of the useful article 
will make the utilitarian aspects of the item less useful. For example, will removing the 
“aesthetic” component made the object do its task less well, or make the object more expensive 
to manufacture? If so, the component is not “separable.” If removing it makes no utilitarian 
difference, however, then it is “separable.” See Goldstein, 1 Copyright § 2.5.3 (physical 
separability exits if the sculptural feature “can be physically separated from the article without 
impairing the article’s utility and if, once separated, it can stand alone as a work of art 
traditionally conceived,” id. at page 2.75; conceptual separability arises when a feature “can 
stand alone as a work of art traditionally conceived, and if the useful article in which it is 
embodied would be equally useful without it.” Id. at page 2:78.1.) 
In some of its cases the Second Circuit has implemented this perspective: explicitly or implicitly 
asking whether the useful article’s functions can be equally well served were the object denuded 
of the portion in which copyright is claimed. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 
773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985). 
109 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § §113 (b) and 113 (c); 102(b) (2012). Subsection 113(b), discussed at 
further length infra at __, provides in essence that “the copyright in a work portraying a useful 
article as such would not protect against manufacture of that article.” Report of the Register of 
Copyrights, General Revision of the Copyright Law (1961) at 14, available at 
http://copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf/. Also see 1976 House Report at 109, 
available at www.copyright.gov/history/law/clrev_94-1476.pdf. 
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A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that 
is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.110 
According to this definition, it is apparently a copyright–appropriate use “to 
portray appearance” (or, presumably to portray any pattern of form to any sense, 
whether the form be, e.g., a pattern of colors, a pattern of sounds, or a pattern of 
dance steps). Similarly, “to convey information” is also a presumptively copyright-
appropriate use. Functions beyond "appearance" and "information" lean in the 
patent direction. Although PGS works are especially singled out for special 
copyrightability hurdles 111 that do not apply to useful articles packaged in non-
PGS formats, the definition is at least suggestive; it suggests that any function 
beyond "appearance" and "information" might be ripe for being classified as none 
of copyright's business.  
Copyright scholars are accustomed to drawing a sharp line between 'useful 
articles' that are pictorial, graphic or sculptural works ("PGS" works), on the one 
hand, and, on the other, the many other kinds of functional-but-expressive 
creations that appear in non-PGS parts of the copyright statute. Given legislative 
history the distinction between PGS works and other works makes sense when 
																																								 																				
110 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The statute gives force to the “useful article” concept most obviously 
in regard to Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural ("PGS") works: useful articles that seek copyright 
under the PGS category must pass a separability test, section 101, and the derivative work right 
attaching to a copyrighted PGS work that depicts a useful articles is narrow will not cover the 
making of the functional articles depicted, section 113(b).   
More controversially, "useful article" has application in regard to functional use more generally, 
pursuant to a broad but plausible reading of 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012). The broad reading of 
Subsection 113(b) is discussed further infra at __. 
111 The statute gives PGS works that serve functions beyond "appearance" and "information" 
rough treatment when it comes to copyrightability. Useful PGS works must pass a 'separability' 
test, as discussed ___ infra.   
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copyrightability is on the table.112  However, when 'scope of right' rather than 
copyrightability is the issue, Congress has not drawn such a sharp line.113  All 
functional-but-expressive creations owe a conflicting allegiance to both copyright 
and to patent; they share many common policies; it may be time for 'useful' PGS 
works and other 'useful' works to learn something from each other.   
The Baker-type cases cited in copyright legislative history are in fact 
consistent with what became the 1976 definition of "useful article".114  These cases 
refuse to impose liability for making a copy or derivative work that does more than 
portray "appearance" or convey "information"-- that is, the  cases give an immunity 
for any version of the copyrighted work that actually functions. 
 Thus, to manufacture furniture,115 lamps,116 or gears117 copied from 
copyrighted graphics in a competitor’s catalogue does not infringe the copyrights. 
																																								 																				
112 :[A]lthough the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, 
the Committee's intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape 
of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial 
product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable 
from the utilitarian' aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill."  
1976 HOUSE REPORT at 55.   
113 See especially the discussion of section 113(b), infra at text accompanying notes ___. 
114 These were cited in regard to what became section 113, as discussed infra at __> 
115 Lamb v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., 39 F. 474 (W.D. Mich. 1889) (defendant alleged 
to have manufactured church furniture depicted in another entity’s copyrighted catalog and to be 
publishing  as advertisements graphics showing its 'own' furniture that virtually duplicated the 
plaintiff's original photos; motion seeking preliminary injunction denied.) 
116 Kashins v. Lightmakers, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (no infringement results 
from making lamps identical to those appearing in a copyrighted catalog).  The case does not 
really assist in fleshing out section 113(b), however, since the plaintiff seemed to claim no 
authorship in the lamp designs that were photographed.  If the plaintiff's originality subsisted 
only in choice of photographic angles and such, a defendant who built the objects depicted in the 
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It also does not infringe to build a highway/bridge interchange based on a 
copyrighted drawing of an original road design.118  These noninfringing acts of 
reproduction are all uses that go beyond “conveying information” and “portraying” 
form; they are on the "use" side of the Baker divide.  Similarly, cases that did 
impose infringement verdicts (i.e., those on the 'explanation' side of the Baker 
divide) involved defendants whose purposes involved only 'information' or 
'appearance'. 
   Thus, it did infringe to build a memorial119 based on a copyrighted 
sculpture. Memorial stones only convey information (such as naming who is 
buried beneath, reproducing lines of poetry, conveying descriptions and dates) and 
portray appearance.  
Similarly, to make a doll120 based on a copyrighted comic did infringe.  This 
too fits the 'useful article' definition; stuffed dolls are not 'useful' because they 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
photo would have used nothing of what made the photos copyrightable. In such a case, 
infringement would not attach whether or not the objects depicted were 'useful'. 
117 In PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the 
defendant’s catalogs copied illustrations of gears from the Plaintiff’s catalogs. It appears that the 
plaintiff had designed the gears, though no inquiry into their originality was made.  The court 
noted that “The component parts so pictured in all the catalogs before us are in the public domain 
and plaintiff has no exclusive right to produce and illustrate them. It is the illustration that is 
protected, not the object itself.” Id. at 110. 
118 Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (copying a 
drawing of a highway/bridge interchange by building such a roadway does not infringe copyright 
in the drawing). 
119 A memorial stone is not a useful article; it merely portrays appearance (e.g., angel wings) and 
conveys information (about the deceased.)  To copy someone else's art in a memorial can 
therefore infringe.  Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936) 
(memorial copied from a photograph was held infringing). 
120 King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1924) (defendant infringed by 
making a three-dimensional doll from plaintiff’s two-dimensional cartoon horse “Sparky”).  The 
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employ only the copied work’s form and “appearance”.  Today's Copyright Office 
does not consider dolls and other toys to be 'useful articles.'121   
There is of course no prescience in the old case decisions; the judges were 
not seeking to anticipate and apply the 'useful article' definition from the 1976 Act. 
To the contrary, any causal relation ran in the ordinary temporal direction.  The 
pre-1976 cases just mentioned are based on Baker v Selden, and those decisions 
along with Baker are part of the source from which the 1976 definitional principle 
drew its legitimacy. The Justice Department's anti-monopoly position too was 
hardly born the moment Congress heard it; the anti-monopoly strains in IP law are 
rooted  
4.1 Tentative Conclusion: Interoperability and Baker 
Returning to Oracle v. Google, it is indisputable that computer programs do 
more than “portray form” and “convey information.” They make machines work, 
and when someone copies code, the copies are typically sold to people for the 
purpose of making other machines work. While neither of these facts about the use 
of computer programs is sufficient to resolve the Oracle case, they remind us 
computer code may be a 'useful article' and that like all useful articles, 
considerations of patent deference can and should play a strong role.  
As mentioned, Baker indicates that expressive use is the kind of use which 
copyright law can legitimately regulate.122 Copying an entire copyrighted computer 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
court imposed liability by finding a parallel between “the production of pleasure in 
contemplation,” mentioned in Baker v. Selden as a legitimate copyright purpose, and the ability 
of Sparky to produce “pleasure in amusement.” Also see Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Freundlich, 
Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934) (involving the Betty Boop doll).   
121 From cases like this arose the current rule treating stuffed animals and dolls as art and not as 
useful articles.  Toys and stuffed animals are typically not considered "useful articles". 
Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices at 502, available at 
http://www.copyrightcompendium.com/#500 
122 See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text. 
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program will of necessity make use of both expressive and nonexpressive 
aspects,123 and using the copy – even using it to run a machine – could therefore 
infringe. Where any possibility exists that the defendant saved herself some 
expressive effort, and that obtaining this advantage played a nontrivial role in 
motivating the copying, it is not as clear that Baker will shelter her behavior.124 
But copying that is done solely to achieve interoperability (with other 
programs or with previously acquired utilitarian skill) is fully indifferent to the 
copied program’s expressive aspects. This is true both for interoperability between 
the copied program and the copier’s program, as in Lotus v. Borland, or 
interoperability between the copier’s program and third-party programs, as in 
Oracle v. Google. What matters for interoperability is not the quality of expression, 
but exact conformity. 
If it is correct that uses indifferent to expression cannot infringe, then a 
proper resolution of Oracle and Lotus is clear. In neither case would the copying 
infringe. 
																																								 																				
123 Were a program to lack any expressive content, it could not have copyright in the first 
instance. 
Whether expression in a program ever “really” exists (in the ordinary-language sense of) or 
whether Congress conclusively deems it to exist (in the sense of a mandatory legal fiction) is a 
question this chapter does not address. Many scholars have addressed the inherent conceptual 
instability caused by Congress including computer programs among the categories of potentially 
copyrightable subject matter. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 
111 Harv. L. Rev. 1149 (1998). 
124 The touchstone examples in Baker involve no use of expressiveness: the medicines made by 
reading a book, the mechanical skills learned from a book … none copy or use the book’s mode 
of “statement” which Baker teaches is the aspect to which copyright attaches. See __ supra. 
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This result does not turn on the value or disvalue of lock-in as a social or 
economic practice.125 A logically prior matter is whether an instance of copying is 
related or unrelated to the copied material’s expressivity. And copying to avoid 
lock-in certainly seems to be unrelated to expression. When having a key made, 
one doesn’t care if the key is clunky or beautiful. Its elegance as a sculptural 
artifact is irrelevant. 
All that matters is that it fits the lock. 
4.2 Juridical Integrity and Lack of “Fit” 
My contention, that copying for interoperability does not infringe, cuts less 
broadly than may seem. To better see this, it will be helpful to examine and 
distinguish the perspective that Abraham Drassinower brings to Baker v. Selden. 
In Professor Drassinower’s view, Baker demonstrates that nonexpressive, 
noncommunicative forms of copying should count as “nonuse,”126 a behavior 
outside the copyright statutes, and thus not actionable under copyright law.127 Only 
																																								 																				
125 Overstating the importance of lock-in economics to the Oracle case is a mistake the Solicitor 
General made in his opposition to certiorari. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), available at 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2015/06/01/14-
410_google_v_oracle_us_cvsg_brief.pdf. 
126 ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (Harvard University Press, 2015) 
(hereinafter “Drassinower”), at 13 (“[In Baker, t]he defendant used the forms as a tool but not as 
a work, and was therefore not liable in copyright… Baker thus turns on a crucial distinction 
between the work as a communicative act and its material form as its physical embodiment. Use 
of the physical embodiment for noncommunicative purposes does not give rise to liability.”). 
127 Drassinower emphasizes that copyright would have reached the accounting form in Baker if it 
had been copied as part of an explanatory book, or copied for other reasons relating to its 
expressive, authorial qualities. The defendant however copied the form for reasons relating to its 
inventive qualities. The set of lines changed role from “work of authorship” to “tool” –resulting 
in a lack of fit’ with copyright, and defendant was not liable. Id. at 100. 
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when a work is used expressively, as a communication, Drassinower argues, can 
the use give rise to copyright infringement.  It’s not that Drassinower argues that 
patent’s public domain has “trumping” power, or that giving patent-like power to 
copyrights is socially costly; his argument is rather that copyright has no role 
beyond its proper (communicatory) sphere. 
While I cannot agree with all of Professor Drassinower’s contentions, I find 
an immensely useful starting point in Drassinower’s observation that mere 
mechanical repetition of a particular physical or audible form does not always use 
the work as a work.128   Sometimes, for example, it is being used as a tool 
(functionally) or as a fact (as evidence in a courtroom) or for some other purpose 
whose value does not depend on the work's expressiveness. 
We all know how a person can change roles, and that different roles (spouse, 
employer, enemy combatant) can trigger different rights and duties both socially 
and under law. Similarly, a given configuration of words (or symbols, sounds, 
shapes, lines or colors) can have different roles in different contexts. 
A new role can change the configuration’s legal significance – either 
because copyright is juridically concerned only with one role, namely, 
communication (as Drassinower might have it)129, or because the new role alters 
the work’s economic and social impact (as policy analysts might have it). 
For an example of changing roles for a copyrighted work, consider a love 
letter introduced into evidence in a divorce proceeding. In the litigation context the 
letter’s eloquence as a work of authorship is irrelevant; the literary work has 
become a fact, valued not for its beauty in language but for what it implies, 
factually, about the relationship between sender and receiver. The same 
copyrightable letter, now serving as a fact rather than as expression, under current 
																																								 																				
128 Id. at 102 (arguing that it is an error to see “any and all uses of a work’s material form” as 
“uses of the work.”) 
129 See generally Drassinower, supra note __. 
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law can be freely copied for evidentiary purposes in litigation.130 It is a “fair 
use.”131 
There are reasons for granting private rights in the first instance, and rights 
should not be exercised for reasons that lie far afield. Functional uses, like 
evidentiary uses, do not reward quality of expression; they do not “fit.” 
If crafting exceptions to the public’s duty-not-to-copy were costless and 
perfectly predictable, lack of fit standing alone would always suffice as ground for 
sheltering a defendant’s activity. Instead, the process consumes some 
governmental and private resources, probably increases uncertainty (in both 
markets and everyday non-commercial behaviors), and might make unlawful 
copying and litigation a bit more likely.132 Rule of Law values such as 
predictability might be poorly served by case-by-case insistence on “fit.” 
Lack of “fit” in a particular instance shows merely that enforcement will fail 
to further a particular law's goals. Courts often want a showing that, in addition, 
refusing to enforce will achieve some affirmative public advantage. They want 
something that can outweigh the extra costs involved in case-by-case recrafting of 
the rules. 
For an example, consider negligence law. It uses the “proximate cause” 
doctrine to immunize defendants from liability when the harm they cause is 
																																								 																				
130 Copying for courtroom purposes is seen as a “fair use,” recognized by cases such as Den 
Hollander v. Steinberg, 419 Fed. Appx. 44 (2d Cir. 2011). 
131 Id. It would be more accurate to say that works of authorship become “facts” when copied for 
evidentiary purposes; unfortunately, however, clear statement about these cases is inhibited by 
the Supreme Court’s odd ontological assertion that “facts” are “found” and never “created.” Feist 
Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (“facts do not owe their origin 
to an act of authorship.”) On this latter point, see Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From 
Feist to Fair Use, 55 L. Contemp. Probs. 93 (1992). 
132 Conceivably each case where a defendant succeeds in finding a limitation could encourage 
new types of copying that might hope (with less ground) to find equivalent shelter. 
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unrelated to the dangers that made their behavior negligent in the first instance. 
Because there is a “lack of fit” between unforeseeable harm and imposing a duty of 
care, a proximate cause limitation makes sense both on juridical grounds and on 
economic grounds.133 
But because “proximate cause” is implemented on a fact-sensitive, case-by-
case basis, which is costly, we expect to find more explanation for the doctrine, in 
addition to simple “lack of fit” – and we do. Eliminating the proximate cause 
doctrine, which would mean imposing liability to the extent of all unforeseeable 
harms caused, could bring with it demoralizing134 and crushing burdens135 of 
																																								 																				
133 Juridically, there is no conceptual linkage between taking reasonable care and avoiding an 
unforeseeable kind of harm. The proximate cause limitation makes sense economically as well, 
for the law is powerless to encourage people to take precautions against invisible dangers. 
A copyright analogue to ‘proximate cause’ can be found in the fair use doctrine, where courts 
tend to find noninfringing a use that is quite unexpected and ‘transforms’ the purpose and 
direction of the copyrighted work.  See generally, Wendy J. Gordon, “Proximate Cause, 
Proximate Use, and the Tort/Copyright Relation,” draft available on request, forthcoming in 
HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY (2016). 
134 “Demoralization cost” is a term coined by Frank Michelman to refer to disincentives (effects 
that discourage productive activity) caused by the threat of large unpredictable losses. Frank 
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just 
Compensation Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214 (1967). 
135 Having to pay an immense judgment can trigger costs much higher than the numbers in the 
judgment itself. For example, tort judgments against companies can cause prices to rise and jobs 
to be lost; tort judgments against individuals may mean losing a home, which in turn leaves 
family members vulnerable to further losses. 
The same point is true on the side of potential plaintiffs: bearing a tortious injury without 
receiving compensation can result in disastrous follow-on costs for both businesses and 
individuals. See Guido Calabresi Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, 27–28 (Yale 
University Press, 1970) (“secondary costs”). Identifying which kinds of cost are likely to be 
more serious in varying circumstances is the task of empirical research. 
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liability.136 These social burdens make a difference, particularly since, given the 
lack of “fit” caused by unforeseeability, the burdens would not even be partially 
offset with gains in encouraging reasonable care.  Taken together, these are 
weighty reasons to adopt a doctrine (called 'proximate cause') to limit liability 
where there is 'lack of fit' in personal injury cases. 
I don't deny that lack of  'lack of fit'  standing alone can and should warrant 
limiting legal enforcement in some circumstances, particularly those involving free 
speech and other fundamental rights.  Outside the area of fundamental rights, 
however, few judges demand that the legislature (in crafting rights) or a particular 
plaintiff (in bringing suit) demonstrate a one-on-one correlation between a 
particular exercise of right and the policies for which the right was granted. Except 
perhaps for juridical purists, law must usually operate on a more wholesale level.137 
Arguably copyright should be one of those rare areas where “lack of fit” 
alone will suffice.138 As a matter of fundamental right, overbroad copyright 
enforcement often threatens first-amendment values.139 As an economic matter, 
copyright liability imposes obvious social costs. Monetary incentives for new 
authorship are generated by making it more expensive to purchase copies of, or 
access to, existing authorship; the increasing costs makes authorship less available 
both for new authors to use140 and for consumers to purchase. 
																																								 																				
136 I am indebted to Bob Bone here. 
137 I am indebted to discussions with Jane Ginsburg for her insistence on this point. 
138 Fundamental liberties are usually linked to avoiding important harms; when this is true, the 
lack of fit means an “extra” element of social harm is present. 
139 Admittedly, we commentators perceive these threats to free speech far more easily than do the 
courts. 
140 A classic statement of these issues is William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Leg. Stud. 325 (1989). 
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These ever-present risks counsel that copyright’s scope should generally 
remain within the arena where these social costs are most likely to be outweighed 
by copyright’s positive incentive effects – which is, definitionally, the arena where 
the elements of the cause of action are a “good fit” with statutory purpose. Only in 
the area of 'fit'-- authorial works being used for authorial purposes-- is the ability of 
copyright enforcement to produce more benefits than costs likely to be more than 
coincidental. And indeed, in copyright law, the fair use doctrine and a multitude of 
specific exemptions provide some shelter from simple “lack of fit.” But we have 
no consensus on how far the shelter should extend, and at the moment it is far from 
complete.141 
As an example of a "lack of fit" that might not give rise to a copyist victory, 
consider a hypothetical decorator who has noticed that sheet music can make 
visually pleasing patterns, and who begins manufacturing wallpaper that duplicates 
the appearance of copyrighted sheet music. In papering its customers’ walls with a 
particular composer’s clefs, eighth-notes, sharps and so on, the wallpaper maker is 
not using the musical work as a musical work. Any connection between the notes’ 
visual appeal and the quality of the work’s intended aural expression is purely 
coincidental. Allowing the composer to collect monies from the wallpaper maker 
does nothing to reward composing skill or encourage its further development.  
There is no "fit.”  
It is possible such copying might be sheltered from liability. 142  Yet given 
the commercial nature of the use, and the obscurity of any claim the wallpaper 
																																								 																				
141 As a matter of current doctrine, a court might impose copyright liability despite “lack of fit” 
unless the defendant can demonstrate an additional public interest dimension that would be 
served by giving her the contested liberty of action. Stacey Dogan makes this point about 
trademark law. Stacey Dogan, Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion, 37 Colum. J. L. 
Arts 503, 506 (2014). 
142 It might, for example, be considered “transformative” under the fair use doctrine. See, e.g., 
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (defendant 
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might have to be serving the public interest, as a descriptive matter the defendant’s 
likelihood of success is rather low.  
        By way of contrast, recall the example of copyrighted works being 
reproduced for evidentiary use in court.  Courts understand the importance of 
providing factual evidence for litigation, and understand also how often the author 
of an incriminating document might wish to assert copyright to prevent its being 
copied.  Establishing a rule that permits copying for evidentiary purposes serves a 
public interest easily understood, and therefore such copying is routinely 
accommodated by copyright’s fair use doctrine.  Judges are likely to be sensitive to 
the different levels of social interest at stake and, even in copyright, “lack of fit” 
alone will not always generate shelter for an act of unconsented copying. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld two statutory expansions of 
copyright with only the roughest guess as to “fit.” Both term extension and 
statutory restoration of public domain copyrights have doubtful ability to further 
copyright goals, and both statutes have implications for free speech; but when 
these statutes were challenged the Court declined to employ strict scrutiny.143   
These developments counsel caution, even though the judiciary's role in deploying 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
applied miniaturized copies of copyrighted Grateful Dead concert posters to mark a timeline of 
the band’s history; held not to infringe on grounds of fair use). 
143 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) upholding the revival of certain copyrights 
already in the public domain; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act). 
In Eldred the Court defined its path: declining to apply a heightened degree of scrutiny. The 
opinion states that “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations” such as 
“fair use” and the idea/expression dichotomy, id. at 219, that make lesser scrutiny appropriate. 
Further, to measure whether “Congress’ exercise of its Copyright Clause authority” was 
“rational,” id. at 206, the Court employed an extremely broad notion of what purposes federal 
copyright could legitimately serve. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: 
Authors, Not Publishers, 52 Houston L. Rev. 613 (2014) (criticizing Eldred’s analysis of 
copyright’s purpose). 
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doctrines like 'the explanation/use dichotomy' or 'fair use' is different from the role 
the Supreme Court plays in reviewing the constitutionality of Congressional 
statutes.  
For such reasons, this chapter does not claim (as a descriptive matter) that a 
lack of “fit” between a copyright defendant’s actions and copyright law’s overall 
policy will always suffice to defeat liability.  Also, given the real costs of making 
fine distinctions among cases, this chapter does not claim (as a normative matter) 
that all non-fitting cases of copying should escape liability.  What the chapter does 
claim is that line-drawing is worth the cost when copyright threatens to control the 
kinds of functional uses that Baker saw as properly relegated to patent. Imposing 
liability on purely functional uses not only fails to advance the goal of 
incentivizing expressive activity; such liability  has the potential for undermining 
the patent system, with effects such as decreasing the disclosure of inventions, and 
shrinking free competition among unpatented utilitarian products. The result, in 
Baker’s language, could be a “fraud upon the public.”144 
These are matters whose importance is difficult to understate. Therefore, 
when it comes to a particular kind of disjunction – between expressive use and 
functional use, or (putting it somewhat differently) between authorship and 
invention – the Supreme Court in Baker held that the cost of disregarding the “lack 
of fit” is too high. 
That, I would argue, is the essential point of Baker v. Selden. 
4.4 Should Mixed Uses Qualify for Baker’s Shelter 
This chapter interprets Baker as resting not only on juridical coherence in 
Drassinower’s sense, but also on consideration of social and economic cost. To 
obtain Baker’s shelter, then, two elements are needed: the user's indifference to 
expression (that is, “non-use” in Drassinower’s sense) and interference in patent 
law’s domain. 
																																								 																				
144 Baker, 101 U.S. at 102. 
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Must the use be purely functional, with no admixture of expressive value? 
From an abstract juridical perspective, as long as some expressive value inheres in 
the use, copyright should be able to find a mixed use (both expressive and 
functional) to be an infringement.  Yet concerns from outside of copyright (such as 
pressure from patent’s public domain) might counsel against copyright owners 
having rights over a mixed area. In terms of Baker's policies, an expressive value 
should be capable of being outweighed or even trumped by a functional role.  
Under Baker, must copyright remain unenforced whenever the use has a functional 
aspect?  These questions remain open, for in terms of our facts-- those of Oracle 
and Lotus-- the nature of the use if fairly 'pure' in its functionality. 
How do we know when a work of authorship is being used solely as a 
functional tool?145 As suggested above, the answer must surely lie in determining 
whether the defendant is indifferent to the stylistic or expressive aspect – if the 
defendant would copy whatever the language or style might be, not caring in the 
least for the content but only for its physical effects, then the copying is of the 
“tool” variety and copyright law does not (or at least should not) reach it.146 
4.5 Directness 
Does the Baker rule apply only to shelter the "users" who employ the copy 
functionally, or does it also shelter those from whom the "users" purchased the 
copies? Lawyers usually think of “direct” versus “contributory” roles in terms of 
secondary liability. (For example, we debate whether computer programs that 
allow consumers to violate copyright law should be held responsible for the 
																																								 																				
145 Within “sole” or “pure” functional use, I include functional uses that are insubstantially or 
trivially concerned with expression. 
146 It may be that mixed uses of copyright works should sometimes be sheltered from liability. I 
need not reach that question, for copying sequences of command names (Lotus) or method 
headers (Oracle) for purposes of defeating switching costs is not a mixed case. 
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consumers’ unlawful behavior.147) In discussing the how far the Baker doctrine 
reaches, however, we address the converse: whether an actor’s contribution to 
another person’s lawful act can be sheltered by the lawfulness of the assisted 
behavior. 
The issue has significance in many areas of copyright law, particularly fair 
use, but within the confines of Baker it can be resolved straightforwardly. The 
defendant in Baker v. Selden was manufacturing account books for sale to others. 
Nothing in the opinion suggests it would have been necessary for the defendant to 
have used the account books himself. Similarly, when a manufacturer uses a 
competitor’s catalogue or drawings without permission as his source for his new 
product line, the statute shelters not only those who use the product he makes, but 
the manufacturers, retailers and advertisers as well.148 Therefore precedent and 
statutory analogy suggest that “directness of use” is not a prerequisite to shelter 
under Baker. 
5 Resistance to the Use/Explanation Distinction 
Some resistance to making distinctions among types of use is evident. One 
hears comments such as, “If an arrangement of lines or symbols is someone’s 
property, the owners should be able control any use they want. That’s what 
property is for.” At one point the Nimmer copyright treatise similarly opines that 
“the question of liability should turn simply on whether the defendant has copied 
copyrightable elements contained in the plaintiff’s work, without regard to the 
																																								 																				
147 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Moral Philosophy, Information Technology, and Copyright: The 
Grokster Case, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 270 (Jeroen van den 
Hoven & John Weckert, eds.) (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
148 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (anyone engaged in “making, distribution, or display”); also see § 113(c) 
(“In the case of a work lawfully reproduced in useful articles that have been offered for sale or 
other distribution to the public, copyright does not include any right to prevent the making, 
distribution, or display of pictures or photographs of such articles in connection with 
advertisements or commentaries related to the distribution or display of such articles, or in 
connection with news reports.”). 
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manner in which the defendant uses or intends to use the copied material.”149 This 
cannot be taken literally. An exemption for patent-type “use” is hardly the only 
copyright limitation tied to “use” issues. 
5.1 “Rights Over Use” as a Conceptual and Economic Fulcrum 
All of copyright operates on two dimensions – to prevail in an infringement 
suit, a plaintiff must prove (1) ownership of appropriate (copyrightable) subject 
matter and (2) that his or her exclusive rights include control over the use that the 
defendant has made of the copyrighted subject matter. 
The overall structure of the Copyright Act thus ties the definition of a 
copyright owner’s rights to defined uses, so that prima facie liability always varies 
with the nature of the defendant’s use even in the statute’s operative core, Section 
106.150 A host of additional uses are categorized as not infringing.151 So, for 
																																								 																				
149 1–2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 2.18 [D] [1]. The Treatise continues: “If … copying of 
copyrightable expression occurs, then infringement should be found, even if the defendant 
employs the material for use rather than for explanation” Id. 
150 See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for 
Contract, 73 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1367 (1998). 
It is equally hard to understand the purported irrelevance of “use” from a statutory perspective. 
The Copyright Act throughout varies rights and duties according to the nature of the use, starting 
with the basic section of copyright owner rights in Section 106, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). The 
statute also empowers judges to make general variations by “use” in the fair use doctrine, 17 
U.S.C. § 107, and variations according to use are fleshed out in the dozens of specific use-
limitations embedded in the statute, id. at 108–22. 
151 The shape of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights can be determined only by examining a 
wide range of sections, namely 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–122, but the primary section is §106. It is 
subdivided by type of use, from reproduction to performance: 
§ 106. Subject to Sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
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example, since only “public” performances can infringe,152 an allegation of private 
performance would be dismissed as not satisfying the plaintiff’s obligation to 
present a prima facie case. The same should be true when a plaintiff seeks 
copyright redress for rights that the Supreme Court or Congress has removed from 
the copyright owner as better relegated to patent’s domain. 
As already mentioned, copyright’s statutory structure places emphasis on 
distinguishing among uses. Differences among uses are also central to how 
copyright functions as an economic engine. 
Congress provides incentives to authors largely by helping copyright owners 
subject the users of their works to differential pricing (“price discrimination”) 
according to intensity of use.153 Copyright law embodies a set of Congressional 
decisions about which uses of a copy should be subjected to this legal power to 
meter (and price) types and frequency of usage. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a 
digital audio transmission. 
152 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (right of public performance for literary works, musical works and 
additional works other than sound recordings); § 106(6) (right of public performance for sound 
recordings). 
153 See Gordon, supra note 124 at 1367. 
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To illustrate, consider again the right of “public performance.”154 Because 
the statute gives the copyright owner prima facie rights to control public 
performance, the copyright owner can distinguish in pricing between the person 
who wants to read a literary work silently to herself, and a person who wants to 
read the work aloud at an auditorium or on radio. The silent reader pays whatever 
price for the copy was charged by her bookstore or online supplier; her use is 
contained in the base price. By contrast, the public performer has to negotiate and 
pay something beyond the price of the copy in order to avoid the risk of an 
infringement suit. She needs to purchase a permission or set of permissions to 
cover her behavior, which usually means she has to disclose to the copyright owner 
economically meaningful data about her behavior in order to obtain a meaningful 
license.155 
Conversely, because the statute gives the copyright owner no rights to 
control private performance, the copyright owner will find it harder to distinguish 
in pricing between, say, a person who wants to read to herself the published script 
of a play, and an ambitious society host who wants to have his friends perform the 
play during a series of dinner parties. These all are private uses under the statute,156 
and do not fall within the domain of an exclusive right. The private reader, the 
living-room performers, and the host may have very differing values for the text, 
but each pays the same (base) price for a copy, without risk of liability arising from 
how they are using it. Congress has decided not to help copyright owners 
distinguish among these home uses. 
																																								 																				
154 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (for literary works, musical works, and additional works other than 
sound recordings) and § 106(6) (for sound recordings). 
155 This brief discussion of permissions is not fully generalizable. A purchaser (rather than a 
seeker of specific permissions) may be better able to conceal details. But even a purchaser of 
copyrights needs to identify herself as such, giving the potential seller some notice of her plans. 
156 Under the statute, a place is not public if it is open only to “a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances.” See 17 U.S.C. §101 (2012) (definition of “publicly”). 
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Defining the types and limits of “exclusive right” is an important part of how 
Congress calibrates the balance between public domain and public duty. Uses that 
are within the copyright domain impose duties on the general citizenry to either 
obtain permissions or refrain from use. Uses that are not within copyright owners’ 
control lie in copyright’s public domain.157 
So “exclusive rights” over types of use are always crucial. It would be odd 
indeed if one of copyright’s most important policies – to avoid interference with 
patent law – found expression only in the dimension of “subject matter” and none 
in the dimension of “exclusive right.”158 
5.2 Further Buttressing Baker’s Use/Explanation Distinction from Attack 
The Oracle court ignored Baker’s careful distinction between different kinds 
of rights of control, and instead treated Baker as an on-off switch that determines 
copyrightability. The fullest articulation of the reasons for such an approach 
appears in the Nimmer Treatise, which argues that, “If copying of copyrightable 
expression occurs, then infringement should be found, even if the defendant 
employs the material for use rather than for explanation.”159 (Although David 
Nimmer, the current author of the Treatise, indicates he is rethinking its position,160 
																																								 																				
157 That a behavior like “building a machine” is in copyright’s public domain, that means that the 
behavior cannot be restrained or penalized by copyright. If a utility patent exists that covers the 
machine, however, the behavior is not in patent’s public domain, and can be restrained by 
patent law. 
158 See the discussion of Hohfeld's terminology, supra note __. 
In sum, a copyright owner’s claim rights over use correlate with the public’s duty to refrain from 
such use. 
159 The Treatise argues, Nimmer on Copyright sec. 2.18; also see sec. 2.18 at n 44. Nimmer’s 
claim has had some influence. See, e.g., Close to My Heart, Inc. v. Enthusiast Media LLC, 508 
F.Supp.2d 963 at n.3 (2007). 
160 See infra note 180. At one point the Treatise follows an interpretation of Baker far more 
congenial to the instant chapter’s viewpoint. See 1–2 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.08[1][a] (2015). 
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the Treatise’s provides a useful point of departure from which to crystallize 
discussion.) 
There are several reasons why it is erroneous to reject the use/explanation 
distinction. Three reasons are matters of positive law. First, the Nimmer position 
relies on dicta from a 1954 case whose reasoning is itself unreliable on this score. 
Second, rejecting the use/explanation distinction ignores both the language of 
Baker itself and post-1954 instantiations of Baker in the courts. Third, a rejection 
of the use/explanation distinction is puzzling because Congress explicitly adopted 
an immunity for practical “use” in the current Copyright Act.161 Finally, as a policy 
matter, ignoring a defendant’s type of use would be inconsistent with both the 
juridical integrity and economic logic of the copyright system. 
1954 Dicta 
In rejecting the use/explanation interpretation of Baker, the Nimmer Treatise 
relies heavily on the 1954 Supreme Court opinion, Mazer v. Stein.162 In Mazer, a 
statuette of a Balinese dancer was employed as the base for an electric lamp, and 
copied for a similar use by another lamp maker.163 The 1954 Court approved 
Baker, but gave Baker a reading that cautiously depended on the case’s particular 
facts: 
Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; 
protection is given only to the expression of the idea – not the idea itself. Thus, in 
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, the Court held that a copyrighted book on a peculiar 
system of bookkeeping was not infringed by a similar book using a similar plan 
																																								 																				
161 17 U.S.C. § 113(b), set forth infra at note 75. This section incorporates by reference a series 
of cases that, largely relying on Baker, refuse to allow the copyright in a work that depicts a 
useful article – such as the copyright in a sketch depicting an automobile or the copyright in a 
blueprint depicting a motor – to be asserted against persons who actually make or build the 
useful article itself. 
162 See, e.g., Nimmer on Copyright sec. 2.18 
163 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
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which achieved similar results where the alleged infringer made a different 
arrangement of the columns and used different headings. 164 
Nimmer builds this observation from Mazer into an argument that the 
Supreme Court in Mazer stripped from Baker’s heritage its concerns with 
functional use.165 
I think such reasoning – trying to turn Baker’s own language into a version 
of the idea/expression dichotomy – misses the mark. As Professor Pamela 
Samuelson has emphasized, the Court’s concern in Baker was not with the general 
principle, already recognized well prior to 1880, that copyright needed to 
distinguish abstract general ideas from particularized expression, but with 
preventing copyright from interfering with the balance between competition and 
incentive set by Congress in the law of utility patent.166 
It was natural for the Court in Mazer to have treaded gingerly in discussing 
Baker. In Mazer, the Supreme Court held that the copyright in the statuette gave 
the plaintiff a valid copyright infringement suit against the competing lamp 
maker.167 Yet lamp-making is a utilitarian kind of use, and Baker cautioned against 
extending copyright over utilitarian uses.168 So perhaps it was fear of being accused 
of inconsistency with Baker that led the Supreme Court in Mazer to stick to the 
narrowest reading of the early case.169 
																																								 																				
164 Id. at 217. 
165 Nimmer on Copyright sec. 2.18 
166 See generally, Samuelson, “Systems and Processes”); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: 
The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 
1984 Duke L. J. 663;  (1984) and Samuelson, Baker v. Selden, supra note 61. 
167 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214. 
168 Baker, 101 U.S. at 102. 
169 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217. 
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In hindsight, however, we see that the Mazer court had no reason to fear 
inconsistency with Baker. The freedom to “use” that was recognized in Baker only 
gave freedom to use for functional purposes, that is, freedom to copy for purposes 
other than explanation and the satisfaction of aesthetic “taste.”170 By contrast with 
Selden’s accounting forms, the Balinese dancer’s form served only “taste.” The 
statuette’s expressive form and graceful lines had no impact on function: it did not 
make the lamp’s shine any brighter or the lamp’s structure any more stable. 
To further see that the statuette served no “functional” purpose, notice what 
happens if the statuette’s expressive features are eliminated: Filing away the 
dancer’s sculpted dress and body would leave a smooth ceramic cylinder. The 
cylinder could hold up the lightbulb and shade – the lamp would function as well 
as it did before.171 So enforcing copyright in the statuette posed no direct challenge 
to patent law: competition based on the functions of a lamp could proceed 
unimpeded whether or not the Balinese dancer shape had a copyright.172 That being 
																																								 																				
170 As mentioned above, Baker cautioned that its “observations are not intended to apply to 
ornamental designs or pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste.” Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 
103–4. 
171 See Samuelson, Systems and Processes at 1960 (“Because Stein’s [plaintiff’s] lamps did not 
function any better or worse for having Stein’s statuette as a base instead of a block of wood, it is 
consistent with Baker to hold that the statuettes were, indeed, copyrightable subject matter 
because the artistic designs they embodied were physically as well as conceptually separable 
from the lamps.”). 
172 That is not to claim that Mazer’s impact was fully costless. The Mazer ruling did make it 
more expensive for competitors to make lamps; they could not use plaintiff’s lamp base as a 
form for “direct molding” and similar processes, or if they did, they would have to then strip off 
the dancer’s features. However, the cost difference related only to decoration, not to function. 
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the case, the defendant in Mazer was not threatened by Baker, even if the Court in 
1954 was not yet in a position to articulate why.173 
The results of the two opinions are sufficiently consistent with each other 
that their statutory embodiments are near neighbors. Section 113(a) of the 
Copyright Act embodies Mazer174 and Subsection 113(b)175 (which will be 
discussed further below) embodies Baker. 
Baker and its Caselaw Progeny 
 
																																								 																				
173 See Samuelson, Systems and Processes at 1960 (“Mazer’s observation about differences 
between the Selden and Baker forms was a simple misreading of Baker, not a radical 
reinterpretation of the case, its holding, and the holdings of Baker’s progeny.”). 
174 Section 113(a) provides: 
Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the exclusive right to 
reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in copies under section 106 
includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise. 
17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012). Thus, under 113(a), a statuette of a dancer did not lose copyright by 
being fastened to a bulb. 
175 Subsection 113(b) was a response to questions such as, “[W]ould copyright in a drawing or 
model of an automobile give the artist the exclusive right to make automobiles of the same 
design?” Congress essentially answered “no.” See 1976 House Report at 109. The statute 
provides: 
§113 (b) This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful 
article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of 
the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17 
or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and 
construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 
17 U.S.C. §113(b). This provision is discussed further infra at <Section D> <All internal cross-
references are tentative and will need to be checked>. 
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The Nimmer treatise relied on 1954 dicta from Mazer which depicted the 
defendant's victory in Baker as resting on a lack of substantial similarity between 
the defendant's forms and plaintiff's form.  The dicta did not accurately portray 
Baker v. Selden. The Supreme Court’s 1880 opinion in Baker showed no concern 
with determining how similar defendant’s forms were to those of plaintiff.  
Moreover, judicial decisions since 1954 continued to posit that the 
functional copying of a copyrighted design is non-infringing.  As one such court 
said, "It is the illustration that is protected, not the object itself.”176  The post-Mazer 
precedent includes cases on which Congress relied in drafting the 1976 Copyright 
Act.177   
																																								 																				
176 PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).  It is not 
clear that the plaintiff could have claimed originality in the design, however.  A better case is  
Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (which predated 
Mazer).  In Muller v. Triborough, the plaintiff claimed "that his copyrighted drawing [of a design 
to unsnarl traffic at a bridge approach] was novel and unique and originated with him."  Citing 
Baker, the court characterized the design as a 'system' and ruled for the defendant despite 
arguable similarities between the drawings and the actual roads the defendant had built.  Note 
that no challenge was made to the copyrightability of the drawing. 
 
 
177 The primary legislative Report for the current Act mentioned with approval a list of twelve 
cases that had appeared in the Supplemental Report of the Register of Copyright (1965) at 48. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 109 (1976)1976 House Report, at 109. Many of the cited cases 
predate Mazer in 1954, but some came later. See DeSilva Construction Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. 
Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962); and PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106, 
110 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Thus, the DeSilva court cited the major copyright treatise of its day, Ball 
on The Law of Copyright and Literary Property, which in turn explicitly relied on Baker. De 
Silva, 213 F. Supp. at 195–6. (Note, however, that the Baker rationale was only one ground of 
several for dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint in DeSilva.)  These cases are discussed at notes 
[103-106] supra. 
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Congressional Implementation 
An absolutist approach to “copyright as property” might suggest that an 
owner’s rights will be unvarying, and that the public has no shelter for “copying 
for use.” Yet not only does Baker provide such a shelter, but Congress has also 
implemented Baker by explicitly enacting a statutory shelter as well. Subsection 
113(b) provides that copyright in a drawing or model that “portrays a useful article 
as such” (such as a copyrighted sketch of a garment, or a copyrighted blueprint for 
a machine) does not grant its owner the full scope of ordinary rights to control 
derivative works.178 
Subsection 113(b) directs that the copyright owner has no rights over the 
“making, distribution or display” of the useful article depicted.179 This is by way of 
contrast to the usual rule, under which the maker of two-dimensional portrayals 
(say, a drawing of a sculpture, or a sketch of a cartoon character) has derivative-
work rights to control the portrayal being adapted into three-dimensional form. 
Thus, the owner of copyright in a drawing of a car can control the making of toys, 
																																								 																				
178 17 U.S.C. § 113 (b) provides: 
This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful article as 
such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of the useful 
article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17 or the 
common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and 
construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 
Section 113(b) constitutionality is open to question on the ground of vagueness. Its vagueness 
may not be fatal: at least one federal statute was held constitutional even though it incorporated 
state law not yet enacted or decided. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958). But 
Section 113(b) makes reference to state and federal law in a manner so general it leaves open to 
question even the sources to be incorporated by reference. See, e.g., Goldstein on Copyright § 
7.4.4 (2014), especially 7:116–1120 (presenting some of the puzzles generated by the 
subsection’s imprecision). 
179 Section 113(b). 
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murals, or movies based on the drawing, but cannot control the construction of a 
working automobile based on it. 
Subsection 113(b) limits the rights that attach to copyrighted portrayals of 
useful articles, but does not impact the copyrightability of the portrayals 
themselves. (Drawings, models, blueprints, or other portrayals of a useful article 
are not themselves “useful articles” because they do no more than convey 
information or portray appearance.180 Since the drawings, etc., are not useful 
articles, in order to obtain copyright the portrayals need not pass the “separability 
test” to which useful articles are subject.181) Rather, Subsection 113(b) leaves intact 
the copyrightability of any expression that depicts a useful article, and instead 
limits the rights that attach to owning the portrayal. 
Patent law imposes many subtle limits on copyright, but the limit in 
Subsection 113(b) is hit-over-the-head necessary: Should rights against copying 
attach to an innovation merely by drawing it, describing it, or modelling it in clay, 
few inventors would go through the expensive and uncertain route of trying to 
persuade federal patent examiners that their mechanical invention is “novel” and 
nonobvious’ – especially since the payoff from succeeding in the more difficult 
and more costly route of seeking a utility patent would be to receive a right only 
																																								 																				
180 Under the statute, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), “A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey 
information.” Therefore, a work is not “useful” (in the sense of being dangerous to patent) unless 
it does something more than “convey information” or “portray appearance.” 2 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 2.18 (2015). A blueprint for a mechanical device is not a “useful article,” even 
though the device as built will be a “useful article.” Id. 
181 The copyrightability of useful articles that are PGS works depends on whether the 
“separability” test can be passed. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of PGS works). Useful 
articles of other kinds might need to pass different tests, such as proof that giving copyright will 
not restrain competition in providing the function because, e.g., ample alternatives to the 
plaintiff’s expression exist that have equal and equivalent functional advantages. 
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marginally stronger than copyright’s,182 which lasts for a term of protection far 
shorter than copyright provides.183 A whole area of patent law – at least, patents in 
mechanical configurations, 184 and perhaps other types of inventions as well –
would cease to exist, and with it the “rights to copy and to use” that patent gives to 
nonpatented inventions185 would also disappear. Subsection 113(b) prevents that 
from happening. 
Here is a Copyright Office Report illustrating the Subsection’s impact on 
day to day objects: 
[T]he copyright in a work portraying a useful article as such would 
not protect against manufacture of that article… 
[C]opyright protection would not extend to the following cases: 
A copyrighted drawing of a chair, used to manufacture 
chairs of that design; 
																																								 																				
182 As mentioned, patent plaintiffs do not have to prove copying, but with technological change 
spreading works across the globe, copyright plaintiffs find it progressively easier to lead juries to 
find “copying” has occurred. 
183 Depending on circumstances, copyrights remain in private ownership at least for seventy 
years, and often for well over a century. Utility patents expire after twenty years. See __ supra. 
184 Subsection 113(b) is usually understood as addressing pictorial works or models that depict 
functional three-dimensional objects.  As I argue below, the subsection is not explicitly so 
limited, and can also be understood as applying to non-PGS works that implicate patent issues, 
such as computer programs. 
185 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989): 
[T]he federal standards for patentability, at a minimum, express the congressional determination 
that patent-like protection is unwarranted as to certain classes of intellectual property. … For 
almost 100 years it has been well established that in the case of an expired patent, the federal 
patent laws do create a federal right to “copy and to use.” Sears and Compco extended that rule 
to potentially patentable ideas which are fully exposed to the public. (Emphasis in original.) 
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A copyrighted scale model of an automobile, used to 
manufacture automobiles of that design; 
A copyrighted technical drawing showing the 
construction of a machine, used to manufacture the machine; 
A copyrighted picture of a dress, used to manufacture the 
dress.186 
Thus, copyright can subsist in a drawing of a dress, in a blueprint of a car, or 
in a scale model of a tractor or teapot. Someone who makes an unauthorized copy 
of such a drawing for illustrative use in a coffee-table book would infringe the 
copyright, as would someone who reproduced the scale models in a toy187 or in a 
new scale model. Those are not uses of functional application that threaten patent. 
By contrast, under Baker and under Subsection 113(b), the public may lawfully 
employ the copyrighted drawing or model to construct working, full-size versions 
of the car, dress, tractor or teapot. This is certainly a special exception pertaining to 
“copying for use.” 
6 Subsection 113(b) Applied Directly to Computer Programs 
Subsection 113(b) does more than support the “use/explanation distinction” 
in Baker. The section can be applied on its own terms to computer copyright 
litigation. 
Programmers write human-readable code (“source code”) that is then 
“compiled” into the binary patterns that computers can understand. The resulting 
																																								 																				
186 Report of the Register of Copyrights, General Revision of the Copyright Law (1961) at 14, 
available at http://copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf/. This 1961 Report was 
approved in the 1965 Supplementary Report at pages ix & 47–9, and that Report in turn was 
relied on in the drafting of Subsection 113(b) in the 1976 Copyright Act. See 1976 House Report 
at 109. 
187 That making toys lies on the “copyright” side of the line was first determined in King 
Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924). Also see Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. 
Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934) (involving the Betty Boop doll). 
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binary pattern, called “object code,” does more than portray information and 
appearance: object code runs the machine. Object code is thus a “useful article.”188 
It might be argued that human-readable source code is a “portrayal” of that useful 
article. If so, Subsection 113(b) might mandate that any functional copy made from 
source code is immune from charges of copyright infringement. 
The following discussion addresses three issues: whether the subsection’s 
language permits or requires it to be applied to computer programs; whether the 
section’s origin in Baker allows the subsection to be applied to computer programs 
and other “literary works”; and whether Subsection 113(b) would immunize not 
only purely nonexpressive uses, but also functional uses that contain a substantial 
admixture of expressive use. 
6.1 Language 
Subsection 113(b) appears in a section entitled, “Scope of exclusive rights 
in pictorial, graphic and sculptural works” (hereinafter, “PGS” works). Computer 
programs are not categorized not as PGS works but rather as “literary works.”189 
The section title seems therefore to indicate that subsection (b) does not apply to 
computer programs. 
However, titles do not trump plain meaning. “[A] heading. … cannot limit 
the plain meaning of the text.”190 
The language of Subsection 113(b) itself does not mention PGS works. It 
could have done so; the language of the preceding Subsection, § 113(a), quite 
																																								 																				
188 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is 
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”) 
189 See, 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) (subject matter), 101 (definitions) (2012). 
190 Yule Kim, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends 31–2 CRS Report 
for Congress (2008), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97–589.pdf. 
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explicitly limits itself to the PGS category.191 The language of Subsection 113(b) is 
by contrast not limited to any particular category of works. 
The statute’s definition of “useful article,” too, is not limited to PGS works 
or any other particular category of works.192 Any work that does more than 
“portray” form or “convey information” (that is, any work that goes beyond 
serving the expressive functions appropriate for copyright regulation) is a “useful 
article”193 – which makes sense, for any such work potentially has implications for 
patent. 
Subsection 113(b) incorporates pre-1978 caselaw by reference, and the 
legislative history mentions particular cases and gives a number of examples. On 
the one hand, that the caselaw cited in the legislative history seems to involve only 
PGS works194 might suggest the subsection should be confined to the PGS context 
																																								 																				
191 17 U.S.C. §§ 113(a) provides: 
Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the exclusive right to 
reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in copies under Section 106 
includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise. 
In my view, subsection (b) articulates a generally applicable rule to remind courts not to let 
copyright erode patent via Section 113(a).  
19217 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian 
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”) 
193 I am on somewhat less secure ground here. The definition of “useful article” indicates that 
proper copyright functions are to convey information or “to portray the appearance of the 
article.” Id. The word “article” is quite general, which helps my interpretation, but the word also 
has connotations of physicality that work against my interpretation. Similar ambiguity afflicts the 
word “appearance.” The term “appearance” can mean any kind of “seeming,” thus standing in 
for all types of form. This helps my interpretation. But the word “appearance” also has visual 
connotations. 
194 Most of the examples and cases cited by Congress or the Copyright Office addressed whether 
manufacturers infringed when they based their three-dimensional functional products on two-
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and not extend to computer programs. On the other hand, none of the cited pre-
1978 opinions expressly limits its principles only to the PGS category.   
The focus on PGS fact patterns is explicable given technological context. 
The bulk of the cited examples date from a 1961 Report,195 and the list of cited 
cases come from a 1965 Copyright Office Report.196 At that stage in law and 
technology, copyright in product shapes posed the most obvious danger to 
patent.197 The same policies that in the 1960s triggered concerns with product 
shape, today also trigger concerns with computer programs.  
An additional wrinkle is presented by Congress's actions in 1980. To see its 
significance, consider some background: 
 Recall that Subsection 113(b) incorporates caselaw ending in 1977, that is, 
cases decided prior to the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act.198 In 1977, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
dimensional drawings whose copyrights were owned by others. The cases are summarized in 
supra notes ___[73–38]__. 
195 Report of the Register of Copyrights, General Revision of the Copyright Law (1961) at 14, 
available at http://copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf/. This 1961 Report was 
approved in the 1965 Supplementary Report at pages ix & 47–9, and that Report in turn was 
relied on in the drafting of Subsection 113(b) in the 1976 Copyright Act. See 1976 House Report 
at 109. 
196 A list of twelve cases that appeared in the Supplemental Report of the Register of Copyright 
(1965) at 48. The primary legislative Report for the current Act mentioned this list with 
approval. See 1976 House Report at 109. 
197 Ordinary literary descriptions posed little danger of giving control over systems, given 
Baker’s insistence that a book copyright gave no rights over any practical sciences it might 
describe. 
198 Again, the statute reads as follows: 
§113 (b) This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful 
article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of 
the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17 
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computer programs had uncertain copyright status; because machine-readable 
copies of literary works did not count as infringing,199 little economically 
meaningful protection could attach even to programs that might in the abstract be 
eligible for copyright.200  That helps explain why Baker-oriented caselaw (or any 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and 
construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 
199 See White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). This decision held that 
copyrights could be infringed only by persons making visually perceptible copies. The decision 
was overturned for most literary works by the Copyright Act of 1976, effective 1978. See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “copies”) (1976); also see 1976 House Report at 52. Computer 
programs, however, remained governed by 1977 law. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976); see 1976 House 
Report at 116. 
200 Computer source code is visually perceptible without machine aid, and in 1977 source code 
probably could be federally copyrighted. But unauthorized disk copies of source code would not 
infringe because the contents of a CD or other machine-readable disk are not visually perceptible 
to the naked eye. Only with the new 1976 Copyright Act, effective in 1978, did the federal 
copyright statute embrace all embodiments that could be perceived “with the aid of a machine or 
device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012): 
“Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method 
now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. … (Emphasis 
added) 
Therefore the federal protection available to source code would be limited (since unauthorized 
object code copies would not be actionable) and object code itself would be unprotectable under 
federal law. 
It might be asked whether state protections for computer programs pre-1978 might be relevant. 
In my view, they probably would not. Subsection 113(b) incorporates only caselaw “construed 
by a court in an action brought under this title.” State copyright actions are not “brought under 
this title.” They reach federal court under diversity jurisdiction. 
The state rights that can appear as pendent claims in an “action brought under this title” are 
claims sounding in state trademark law or other kinds of unfair competition. See 28 U.S. C.§ 
1338 (a): 
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copyright caselaw) on computer programs would be scarce. Moreover, at the same 
time that Congress adopted 113(b), it adopted a special section to govern computer 
programs. That special provision, Section 117, fixed the law of computer copyright 
also at the end of1977.201 
Then, in 1980, Congress amended Section 117 and the copyright act’s 
definitions202 to bring computer programs into modern federal copyright.203 Also, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair 
competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the [federal] copyright, 
patent, plant variety protection or trademark laws. … (Emphasis added) 
Nevertheless, state copyright claims have been brought under a variety of labels, including 
“misappropriation” which is a type of unfair competition. So the potential relevance of pre-1978 
state copyright law for Subsection 113(b) remains unresolved. 
Note that in 1978, the federal copyright act abolished most state copyright law. 17 U.S.C. §301 
(2012) (pre-emption). 
201 17 U.S.C. §117 (1976) as originally enacted read as follows: 
§117. Scope of exclusive rights: Use in conjunction with computers and similar information 
systems. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title does not afford to 
the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work 
in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring 
information, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded 
to works under the law, whether title 11 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on 
December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this 
title. 
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–553, title I, § 117, Oct. 19, 1976, available at 
http://copyright.gov/history/pl94-553.pdf. 
202 In 1980, Pub. L. 96–517 inserted a definition for “computer program” into the statute, 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
203 Pub. L. 96–517. 
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starting in1978, machine-readable disks counted as “copies” and, if unauthorized, 
could infringe.204 However, Congress did not amend Subsection 113(b).  
The upshot: Reading the 1980 amendments in conjunction with the un-
amended Subsection 113(b), Congress could be seen as eliminating one barrier to 
enforcing copyright in computer programs but retaining another: it eliminated the 
old visual-bound definition of “copy,” but retained the public’s liberty to employ 
copyrighted portrayals of useful articles to make and sell functioning versions of 
those articles without authorization. 
6.2 Is Baker only for accounting forms and other PGS works? 
Baker v. Selden205 dealt with a pictorial work.  However, it was not limited 
to the pictorial context. To the contrary, the Court’s analysis took as its touchstone 
the public’s liberty to make machines or use systems described in books. It was 
from examples involving literary works that the Court built the public’s liberty to 
reproduce Selden’s pictorial accounting forms. 
Thus, the Court writes: 
[T]there is a clear distinction between the book as such and the art206 
which it is intended to illustrate. …. A treatise on the composition and 
use of medicines, be they old or new; on the construction and use of 
ploughs, or watches, or churns; … would be the subject of copyright; 
but no one would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give 
																																								 																				
204 The 1980 amendments eliminated the 1977 reference point that had been embedded in 
Section 117, and inserted a definition of “computer program” as “literary work” into Section 
101. Pub. L. 96–517 (1980). This made the general provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act – and 
its definition of “copy” – applicable to programs, so that “unaided” visual perception became 
irrelevant. 
205 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1800). 
206 “Art” in this context refers not to aesthetics but to practical skills, as in the “arts” of 
husbandry, carpentry, or medicine. 
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the exclusive right to the art or manufacture described … To give to 
the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described 
therein when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially 
made would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the 
province of letters patent, not of copyright. …207 
The Court repeats and elaborates the point,208 and returns to new literary-
work examples, such as books about the art of perspective.209 
When the Court finally turns to graphic and pictorial works (such as the 
accounting forms at issue in Baker), the opinion returns to literary works as its first 
and primary point of reference: 
Had he used words of description instead of diagrams (which merely stand 
in the place of words), there could not be the slightest doubt that others, applying 
the art to practical use, might lawfully draw the lines and diagrams which were in 
the author’s mind, and which he thus described by words in his book.210 
																																								 																				
207 Id. at 102 (emphasis added). 
208 The Court writes: 
…Take the case of medicines. Certain mixtures are found to be of great value in the 
healing art. If the discoverer writes and publishes a book on the subject (as regular 
physicians generally do), he gains no exclusive right to he gains no exclusive right to the 
manufacture and sale of the medicine; he gives that to the public. If he desires to acquire 
such exclusive right, he must obtain a patent for the mixture as a new art, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.  
Baker v Selden, 101 U.S. 102–3 (emphasis added) 
209 Id. at 103. 
210 Id. at 103 (emphasis added). The Court wrote these works in regard to one of its many 
examples, namely, a “book on perspective.” The opinion quickly made clear, id. at 104, that 
these observations were directed to Selden’s accounting forms as well. 
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Just as a graphic design or a set of diagrams “merely stand in the place of 
words”211 for the Court in Baker, so can words stand in the place of graphic 
designs and diagrams for Subsection 113(b). 
To see how closely Subsection 113(b) fits Baker’s treatment of literary 
works, note that Baker ‘s examples could be restated using the words of the 
subsection: The subsection tells us that an “owner of copyright in a work that 
portrays a useful article as such” has no rights to control the manufacture of the 
useful article itself. Therefore (turning to Baker’s examples), the “owner of 
copyright in a [literary] work that portrays” a medicine, system or device, gives no 
rights to control those who use the book to make the medicine, employ the system 
or build the device.212 
6.3 Mixed Uses 
Baker’s facts seem to describe a purely functional use of the accounting 
forms. If Subsection 113(b) goes further, and applies even to uses that mix 
functional and expressive uses, the subsection’s sweep against the enforceability of 
programs will be broad indeed, because most copies of computer programs will be 
used functionally at least in part.213 Does Subsection 113(b) extend to mixed uses? 
																																								 																				
211 Baker at 103. The paragraph from which the quoted words are drawn is quoted in full just 
above, in text at note 117. 
212 In the Court’s words, “The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to 
communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be 
frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.” 
Id. at 103 
213 Source code can be copied for explanatory purposes. For example, open-source licenses 
typically require the sharing of source code in part to explain what a program does and how it 
does it. See www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.en.html. 
Copying source code for explanatory purposes without license can infringe. Section 113(b) by its 
own terms has no relevance to copying done to serve proper copyright purposes such as 
explanation and amusement. See __ supra. 
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The post-Baker cases that give meaning to Subsection 113(b)214 suggest it 
might extend so far. The cases involved inter alia chairs, lighting fixtures, and 
other furnishings that various defendants had “built” without permission by 
copying their competitors’ copyrighted drawings and photos. It is highly likely that 
some of these copyrighted pictorial works showed furnishings that contained 
separable ornamental features, such as statuettes on lamp bases or flower designs 
on upholstery. It is even likely that some of the copying was motivated by a desire 
to capitalize on the market appeal of such ornamental elements. 
Yet the courts gave the defendants in these cases the liberty to build and sell 
working duplicates of what appeared in the pictures, without regard to whether or 
not the portrayed objects might have contained separable ornamental features.215 
Consider a drawing of a chair that contained a separable work of authorship (such 
as an original design of colors or flowers applied to the chair seat). These cases 
seem to suggest that the act of constructing the article depicted cannot result in 
infringement even if the defendant’s chair seat bore a duplicate of the separable 
flower design.216 If so, the limits that Subsection 113(b) puts on a copyright 
																																								 																				
214 The cases are summarized at notes _ [103-107]_ supra. 
215 “An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a useful article.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (“definition of useful article”). Subsection 113(b) gives rights to build whatever is depicted 
in the drawing of the useful article, which according to this definition would include all parts, 
including separable artistic works. 
Thus, there is no infringement when a stranger without authorization builds a chair that 
purposely duplicates a copyrighted portrayal – even a portrayal that shows a chair designed with 
a separable ornament. The rule is different if a designer does more than portray her design in a 
drawing or sketch, but actually builds it. A stranger who builds a chair that purposely duplicates 
a designer’s as-built chair might infringe if the chair has an ornament that is arguably separable. 
216 Under this provision’s wording, a designer who sketched a chair (for example) could not use 
her copyright in the two-dimensional sketch to restrain a competitor from building the chair, 
even if the designer had included in her sketch elements of the chair which would be “separable” 
(and copyrightable) if she built the chair. Paul Goldstein criticizes the subsection for exempting 
the copying of “separable” features from a copyrighted portrayal of a useful object, but does not 
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owner’s rights apply to shelter copying that is partly motivated by expressive 
concerns. Giving Subsection 113(b) such breadth for PGS works makes some 
sense: no one wants the utilitarian product markets to be subject to strike suits by 
doodlers who see some resemblance between a manufactured product and some 
fantasy sketches they have posted on social media.217 If the doodlers cannot argue 
“separability” as a way to withstand motions to dismiss – if Section 113(b) can be 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
seem to challenge that the subsection has that effect. 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.4.4.1, 118 
(2014). He suggests that a court should first assess the copyrightable elements if any in the 
design being depicted, and then compare that element of copyrightable (separable) expression to 
the appearance of the defendant’s functioning object. 
Instead, the subsection seems to provide that the designer would have to authorize the 
construction of an actual chair in order to have copyright in the separable components. 
There are some good reasons for requiring the designer to engage in such a two-step dance. 
Images of useful and potentially useful articles abound, from Dufy’s sailboats to Dali’s melting 
watches. Should a designer of actual objects be afraid to take inspiration from the painters and 
visual fantasists who might never make the three-dimensional objects they have dreamed up and 
depicted on canvas or in print? The Section 113(b) rule means that only copying from an actual 
useful article will make someone liable for reproducing the separable (copyrightable) parts. 
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly cumbersome to withhold copyright in “separable” parts until the 
designer brings the useful article to life. Paul Goldstein argues as a policy matter that this aspect 
of Subsection 113(b) should be altered. 
217 Note that my example here focuses on a plaintiff's sketches rather than on a plaintiff's 
constructed design. The law may differ for each context. 
Subsection 113(b) appears to allow members of the public to build any and all aspects of a useful 
article that they copy from a copyrighted drawing, whether or not any aesthetic element is 
'separable' from the useful components.  By contrast, if the designer actually constructed the 
article in question, she could have a copyright in its  'separable' elements.   
The difference in legal result may be attributable to the minor investment required to merely 
sketch a useful article (and thus the greater threat that, in the absence of Subsection 113(b), 
sketches would pose to patent) as compared with the effort required to construct a three-
dimensional article.   
	76					WJ	GORDON		April	7,	2016		DRAFT		HOW	ORACLE	ERRED	(LONG	VERSION)	
	
	
used even by defendants who “build” and use a portrayal’s expressive content – 
patent law may be safer. 
But for computer programs, it is dangerous to extend Subsection 113(b) to 
shelter functional uses with substantial expressive content. It’s hard to imagine any 
functional copying of source code that could survive a statute so interpreted. Also, 
if Subsection 113(b) extended that far, it would make other computer-related 
provisions of the Copyright Act surplusage.218 
																																								 																				
218 In the 1980 amendments to Section 117, Congress gave the public some liberties to use 
computer programs functionally. For the public to need such a specific set of liberties, Congress 
would seem to have been assuming that (without the specified new liberties) some functional 
uses of programs could be infringing. If Subsection 113(b) reached mixed uses, then all but the 
archival portion of Section 117 would be surplusage. (The liberty to make and keep an archival 
copy, 17 U.S.C. 117(a) (2) (2012), does not involve a functional use, and thus does not invoke 
either Baker or Subsection 113(b).) 
By contrast, if Subsection 113(b) reaches only uses that are very substantially or purely 
functional, then computer copyrights would remain enforceable against defendants whose 
purposes are substantially related to “style and expression.” (Were copying of programs never 
done for purposes related to “style and expression,” CONTU at 22, then Congress certainly did 
err – perhaps on a Constitutional level – in accepting computer programs into the list of 
copyrightable works!) 
In short, a narrow reading Section 113(b) leaves untouched all copying that is done for mixed 
purposes of function and expressiveness. If so, Section 117 provides liberties that go beyond 
Section 113(b), and applying 113(b) to computer programs does not make Section 117 
surplusage. 
If copying for mixed purposes of function and expressiveness is not embraced by Baker or by 
Subsection 113(b), a wide range of copying remains potentially open to copyright’s control – 
that is, Baker leaves untouched all copying that is done for mixed purposes of function and 
expressiveness. If so, Section 117 provides needed liberties that go beyond Section 113(b), and is 
not surplusage. 
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As a policy matter, this chapter argues, Subsection 113(b) should either be 
limited to purely functional and nonexpressive uses, or should be limited to PGS 
works. 
Limiting the subsection to functional uses that are fully non-expressive is 
admittedly in some tension with the language of the subsection, for that language 
seems to treat all “portrayals of useful articles” the same. But it must be 
remembered that Subsection 113(b) merely incorporates caselaw, including 
distinctions that the caselaw might embody. Refusing to apply Subsection 113(b) 
to “mixed” uses is not inconsistent with the relevant caselaw. None of the cases I 
have found explicitly say that deference to patent requires giving the public a 
liberty to construct useful articles that have separable and copyrightable parts. 
Under my more narrow reading, then, the subsection would only shelter use that is 
both functional and fully nonexpressive. 
One final note is needed, regarding the copying of “object code,” that is, 
copying directly from the machine-readable disk to make another disk. 
6.4 Copying Computer Object Code 
Subsection 113(b) limits the rights of those who own copyrights in drawings 
and other portrays of useful articles, and does not limit the rights of those who own 
copyrights in useful articles themselves.219 And useful articles can indeed have 
copyrights.220 A computer programmer typically does more than “portray” a useful 
																																								 																				
219 Note that Subsection 113(b) is also inapplicable to cases where the defendant has copied a 
work that portrays an article that is not useful. This rule does not change even if the copy is then 
applied to a useful object. See Falk v. T. P. Howell & Co., 7 F. 202 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1888) 
(infringement results from copying an artistic work even though the defendant used it to decorate 
a chair back); 17 U.S.C. 113(a) (2012), 
220 Useful articles can have copyright. As mentioned, “PGS works” that are useful articles can be 
copyrighted as to those aspects that pass a “separability” test. 17 U.S.C. 101 (2012) (defining 
PGS works). “Architectural works” that are useful articles are copyrightable to the extent their 
features are not “functionally required.” See H.R. Rep. No. 101–735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20–
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article. Consider Sun Microsystems, Oracle’s predecessor in interest which was 
largely responsible for Java.  Sun not only created Java source code (a “portrayal” 
of a useful article); it actually created indisputably “useful article” namely, Java 
object code. 
Even if making a functional copy of a source code (a “portrayal”) is non-
infringing because of Subsection 113(b), that section is simply inapplicable to acts 
that copy useful articles themselves. Infringement can result from making a 
functional copy of object code. 
As a factual matter, it seems unlikely that Google copied Java object code.221 
But what if a defendant also copied from object code? If so, Subsection 113(b) 
drops out as a potential shelter for that aspect of the defendant’s behavior. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951–2. Different kinds of useful articles can 
thus be governed by different tests. 
What tests should govern the copyrightability of computer code is of course much debated in the 
context of Oracle v. Google. This chapter does not reach that issue, but rather addresses the 
question of what rights should attach to code even if copyrightable. 
221 Source-code versions of Java commands and input specs were widely available, and evidence 
in the case shows that Google did indeed use the source code. For example, a “slide show” that 
Java prepared for litigation highlighted this colloquy (from a deposition): 
Q. Did you consult the Java docs when doing your work on the API implementations for 
Android? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And where did you obtain those Java docs? 
A. They’re posted for free on Sun’s website. 
Deposition of Bob Lee, August 3, 2011, quoted in Google Employees Consulted Sun’s 
Copyrighted Java Materials When Implementing Android, from Oracle Slideshow, available at 
www.cnet.com/pictures/oracles-slideshow-alleging-how-google-copied-java-images/2/ (last 
visited June 29, 2015) 
	79					WJ	GORDON		April	7,	2016		DRAFT		HOW	ORACLE	ERRED	(LONG	VERSION)	
	
	
Nevertheless, as for all copying, a copyright owner’s rights over the copying 
of object code are governed by Supreme Court precedent, including Baker. If the 
copying was fully nonexpressive in nature, then under Baker no infringement of 
copyright would result. 
6.5 Does the breadth of Subsection 113(b) govern? 
Baker mandates freedom to copy non-expressively; its mandate is less clear 
in cases where copying is a mixed case of expressive and nonexpressive use. By 
contrast, Subsection 113(b) is not limited by inquiry into the defendant's pure 
concern with function.  It is likely that attractive features triggered some of the 
copying of furniture and lamps in the old cases; Subsection 113(b) seems to 
mandate that the public has freedom to copy portrayals of useful articles by 
building the articles even if the copying was partly motivated by a desire to capture 
expressive elements. 
Subsection 113(b) thus might sweep more broadly than Baker itself. 
Fortunately, in cases of fully nonexpressive copying like Oracle, the courts 
need not reach the scope of Subsection 113(b). Baker itself suffices. In fact, in the 
computer context, I think that Subsection 113(b) functions best as an echo and 
reinforcement for Baker rather than an independent source of command. It is 
nevertheless time for the legal community to see that the subsection potentially has 
significant impact. 
7 Conclusion 
Copyright has no inherent interest in governing copying that is indifferent to 
expression, such as copying a letter to present evidence in a lawsuit, or copying a 
sculptural key shape to unlock a door. To regulate such copying would be foreign 
to copyright’s interior logic.222 From an economic perspective, also, incentives to 
create more or better expression can have only random correlation with copying 
that is motivated by expressive-indifferent concerns. 
																																								 																				
222 For one eloquent view of this interior logic, see Drassinower, discussed supra at __. 
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Because line-drawing among types of copying can be costly, infringement 
claims need not be struck down every time an act of copying does not “fit” 
copyright’s expressive paradigm. But often a lack of “fit” is linked to significant 
policy concerns. In Baker v. Selden the Supreme Court made clear that line-
drawing among forms of copying is worth the attendant costs, and must be done, 
when broad enforcement would give copyright law the power to redraw boundaries 
that Congress has entrusted to patent. 
It is not just caselaw that demonstrates this sensitivity. The Copyright Act 
also includes provisions that limit copyright owners’ rights out of deference to 
patent law. 
One such Copyright Act provision, Subsection 113(b), provides that the 
rights that attach to owning copyright in the portrayal of a useful article do not 
cover the functional use – the making or sale – of the useful article itself. Taking 
the section literally, it could immunize defendants who made functional copies of 
source code because source code is a “portrayal” of the useful article known as 
object code. In the recent case of Oracle v. Google, it appears that Google copied 
from source code rather than from object code; if so, Google’s copying could be 
sheltered by Subsection 113(b). 
However, Subsection 113(b) may sweep very broadly, and it is not certain 
how Congress meant its language to be interpreted. Baker itself can suffice to 
resolve Oracle v. Google and similar disputes. Baker indicates that where copying 
is done with indifference to expressive values, and to serve utilitarian goals of the 
kind that governed by the law of utility patent, copyright infringement should not 
result. 
Oracle v. Google, like Lotus v. Borland before it, involves a kind of 
interoperability that is needed to fight lock-in: interoperability between a 
newcomer program and the relevant public’s habituated skills and its existing 
macros or other programs. In the Oracle case, the goal of the copying was to help 
third-party programmers, who were habituated to Java, more easily interoperate 
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with Google’s Android platform. Google’s copying the familiar method headers 
from Java into Android enabled the programmers choose whether or not to work 
with the Android platform on its merits, rather than being discouraged by the 
switching costs involved in recrafting their programming habits. In Lotus, the goal 
of the copying was to help customers of an established spreadsheet program decide 
whether or not to choose a new spreadsheet program on its merits, rather than 
being held to the old program by the switching costs involved in learning new 
meanings for keys and recreating macros. 
In both these cases, the plaintiff’s programs were not copied because they 
embodied skilled expression; in both cases the defendants carried the “heavy 
lifting” of creating new implementation code independently. What copying 
occurred was not done to spare the defendants the effort, money, or other resources 
that would be involved in creating high-quality expression. Instead, the copying 
was done for the purpose of conforming with exactness to whatever the dominant 
program specified; the copying was done without regard to the quality, vel non, of 
what was copied. 
Under the canonical case of Baker v. Selden, as reinforced by Baker’s 
progeny in both caselaw and the copyright statute, the copying in Lotus and Oracle 
did not infringe. And this conclusion need not follow from copyrightability, or 
from “fair use,” but from the plaintiff’s lack of prima facie right to control 
functional use. Going forward in Oracle and other cases that charge infringement 
of computer copyrights, Baker’s use/explanation distinction can play a clarifying 
role. Patent law gives the public rights to copy and to use223 that Baker, its 
progeny, and the pattern of the copyright statute all tell us copyright should not 
undo. 
 
 
																																								 																				
223 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989). 
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